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ABSTRACT 
 
Rasmussen (1997) shows how it may be possible to go beyond an acceptable safety boundary, 
and if crossing the boundary is irreversible, an error or an accident may occur.  Organizations 
reside as a specific operating point within three specific boundaries.  The three boundaries are: 
the economic failure boundary, the unacceptable workload boundary, and the boundary of 
functionally acceptable performance.   
 
Safety Management System (SMS) regulations require that airlines look proactively at their 
operations through a monitoring process with the aim to react, learn, and anticipate before safety 
issues give rise to the potential of creating an accident.   
 
The following thesis will look at airline’s flight operations monitoring system to see if the 
organization uses Resilience Engineering concepts to enhance their ability to create work 
processes that are robust yet flexible enough to adapt to varying risk scenarios, and whether the 
organization is proactive in its approach when faced with disruptions and ongoing economic and 
production pressures before it goes beyond the boundary of acceptable performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Within any work environment, worker behavior is shaped by objectives and constraints.  
Examples of objectives and constraints are, inter alia, work load, economic constraints, risks, 
administrative constraints, management pressures, safety constraints, unacceptable work 
loads, and production and performance targets (Rasmussen, 1997).  These objectives and 
constraints form a boundary of acceptable performance that organizations tend to operate 
within.  Rasmussen (1997) succinctly portrays the goal conflict and the constant movement 
towards the boundaries of acceptable performance organizations constantly face.  He refers to 
this as “systemic migration of organizational behavior toward accident under the influence of 
pressure toward cost-effectiveness in an aggressive, competing environment” (p.189).   
Organizations can either succeed or fail in balancing safety while facing external pressures.   
 
In aviation, many operators have taken a reactive approach to safety by looking at past 
occurrences and focusing on whom is responsible rather than why the occurrence took place 
(Dekker, Cilliers, Hofmeyr 2011).  This process has involved a mechanistic philosophy, use 
of hindsight bias, and linear Newtonian-Cartesian thinking.   There are numerous examples of 
organizations that successfully balance objectives and constraints while maintaining a safe 
operation and those that could not, ending in failure because of a catastrophic occurrence.  
  
Many air operators use a quality assurance program to meet minimum regulatory 
requirements believing that doing so will keep them safe.  Unfortunately, strictly adhering to 
regulatory requirements, and when problems arise, developing additional regulations, or more 
procedures to “fix the problem”, does not take into account the complexities and emerging 
properties of a complex organization.  This approach can fall short in foreseeing and meeting 
the shifting demands of a resource-limited environment, and in how to deal with uncertainty, 
fundamental surprises and multiple conflicting goals (Woods and Shattuck 2000, Dekker and 
Lundstrom 2007).  Cumulative regulations and additional operating procedures aimed to 
address “one of safety issues” may have a negative impact on safety by increasing violations 
of procedures, making employees become reluctant to report incidents, and add complexity to 
the safety monitoring strategy (Amalberti 2001, Dekker 2003).   
 
Instead, there is a need to look proactively at complex organizations and monitor, react, learn, 
and anticipate before latent safety issues are allowed to fester and grow, giving rise to the 
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potential of creating an accident.  Rather than waiting for an event to occur before responding, 
the regulatory requirement for a Safety Management System (SMS) has helped certificate 
holders become more proactive through the implementation of legislative requirements that 
require an airline establish proactive systems that use risk management and other safety 
processes (ICAO 2012); although, much work to accomplish this shift remains to be done.    
 
Many international regulators promulgated a regulatory requirement for operators to have a 
SMS.  In Canada, regulations require that large, commercial air operators, have a SMS.  The 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has also asked member states to regulate 
their air operators to have a SMS.  ICAO Safety Management Manual, Doc 9859, Third 
Edition – 2012, discusses the four underlying elements required in SMS.  They are as follows: 
 1. Safety	  and	  policy	  objectives	  2. Safety	  risk	  management	  3. Safety	  assurance	  4. Safety	  promotion	  (p.59)	  
 
Of particular interest to this thesis will be the focus on safety risk assessment and safety 
assurance, in which safety performance monitoring resides.  
 
Research Question 
 
Rasmussen (1997) shows how it may be possible to go beyond an acceptable safety boundary.  
This thesis will endeavor to show if resilience engineering (RE) concepts are present in an air 
operator’s flight operations monitoring systems.  In particular, I will see if the organization 
uses RE concepts to enhance their ability to create work processes that are robust yet flexible 
enough to adapt to varying risk scenarios, and whether the organization is proactive in its 
approach when faced with disruptions and ongoing economic and production pressures.  To 
do so, I will investigate whether flight operations quality assurance monitoring takes 
complexity and emerging properties of a system into account, whether it relates the socio-
technical interactions of an organization, and whether the use of resilience engineering 
principles exist.   
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My thesis question is:  Is there evidence of resilience engineering concepts within aircraft 
flight operation’s monitoring systems and do they help aircraft flight operations stay 
within safety boundaries and also improve safety? 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
My theoretical framework will consist of the following: 
 1. Staying	  in	  a	  safe	  environment	  2. Drifting	  towards	  the	  boundary	  of	  unacceptable	  performance	  3. Monitoring	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  production	  point	  at	  the	  boundaries	  
 
Staying in a Safe Environment 
 
Cook and Rasmussen (2005) indicate that all organizations reside as a specific operating point 
within three specific boundaries.  They describe the boundaries as “difficult to manage 
technical situations…that because the environment is dynamic, the operating point moves 
continuously” (p130).   The three boundaries are: the economic failure boundary, the 
unacceptable workload boundary, and the boundary of functionally acceptable performance.  
Socio-technical processes can push the system operating point towards an unacceptable 
boundary (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005).   Rasmussen’s (1997) diagram seen in Figure 1 
below depicts these boundaries and shows that the workspace navigated freely by workers are 
bounded by administrative, functional, and safety related constraints.  Dekker (2003) indicates 
that: “informal work systems emerge and thrive in the first place because procedures are 
inadequate to cope with local challenges and surprises” (p.234). Through normal changes 
found in local work conditions, workers influenced by management’s cost gradient can define 
what effort they will provide (effort gradient).  The requirement for an organization to be 
better, cheaper, faster than their competitors will squeeze the production point and push it 
towards the boundary of functionally acceptable performance.  As Rasmussen indicates: “The 
result will very likely be a systematic migration toward the boundary of functionally 
acceptable performance and, if crossing the boundary is irreversible, an error or an accident 
may occur” (p.189). 
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Figure 1.  Under the presence of strong gradients behavior will very likely migrate toward the boundary of 
functionally acceptable performance.  Rasmussen (1997, p. 190) 
 
Organizations have tried to control worker behavior and system performance by imposing 
detailed procedures on how work is to be accomplished.  Many of these procedures are 
developed to be very restrictive, with an aim to cover all aspects of an operation.  Procedures 
that are overdesigned may not conform to actual work performed.  In reality, gaps often exist 
between procedures and practice.  Procedures become inadequate because their conception of 
work collides with the scarcity, pressure, and multiple goals of real work (Dekker 2003, 
Rasmussen 1997).  Rasmussen prescribes a different view on system modeling by suggesting 
a change in approach to the control of system performance.  Rasmussen describes this new 
approach as: 
 
Rather than striving to control behavior by fighting deviations from a particular pre-
planned path, the focus should be on control of behavior by making the boundaries 
explicit and known and by giving opportunities to develop skills at boundaries. (p.191) 
 
The difficulty lies in determining where the boundaries exist.  Employees need to be aware of 
the boundaries so not to cross them, develop coping skills in order to operate at or near the 
boundary; thereby, optimizing work and making the organization more efficient.  Resilience 
Engineering (RE) concepts can help with this aspect.   
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Resilience Engineering 
 According	  to	  Hollnagel,	  Nemeth,	  Dekker	  (2009):	  “Traditional	  theories	  focus	  on	  human	  failure	  and	  success	  as	  closely	  related	  phenomena…resilience	  is	  about	  having	  adaptable	  reserves	  and	  flexibility	  to	  accommodate	  those	  challenges”(p.1446).	  	  	  A	  working	  definition	  of	  Resilience	  Engineering	  (RE)	  by	  Woods	  and	  Hollnagel	  (2006)	  is:	  “the	  ability	  of	  systems	  to	  anticipate	  and	  adapt	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  surprise	  and	  failure”(p.4).	  	  The	  opposite	  of	  resilience	  is	  brittleness.	   Key	  elements	  of	  a	  resilient	  organization	  are	  the	  ability	  respond, learn, anticipate and monitor	  (Dekker,	  Hollnagel,	  Woods,	  Cook,	  2008).	  	  
Woods (2006) indicates that: “Resilience Engineering provides organizations with help on 
how to decide when to relax production pressure to reduce risk” (p. 2239).  The challenge is 
to recognize when to make the relaxation/sacrifice judgment, and in how an organization and 
its employees realize when it needs to be accomplished (i.e. through recognizing the 
boundaries and learning skills to adapt).  
 
Control of System Performance 
 
Management structures have fallen behind the development of complex technological 
structures. The command-and-control approach that uses top-down conduct rule making does 
not work effectively in dynamic situations (Rasmussen 1997).  Individual workers need to 
adapt to their environment in order to make things more effective.  The issue lies in how to 
make sure that it is done safely.  For this to happen, a fundamentally different view on system 
modeling is required. The use of “new approach in the control of system performance” 
(Rasmussen 1997) is key.  
 
Flight operations organizations that have established safety management processes stand a 
better chance of success at maintaining a safe operation with a new approach to control of 
system performance than organizations that strive to control workers by imposing more 
operational standards and norms, and are simply reactive in nature (Rasmussen, 1997, Snook 
2000, Amalberti 2001, Leveson 2004, Dekker 2005).   Rasmussen (1997) indicates that use of 
risk management will “increase the margin from normal operation to the loss-of-control 
boundary” (p192), in other words, the operation will have more capacity to absorb surprises.  
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There are a number of methods that can be used to accomplish a new approach to control of 
system performance.  You must be able to explicitly identify the constraints of the work 
system and the boundaries of acceptable operation in a dynamic operation.  For well-
structured and tightly coupled systems protected by multiple, technical defenses, predictive 
risk analysis have been used successfully.  During his discussion on using risk management to 
control the margins, Rasmussen (1997) indicates that:  
 
The most promising general approach to improved risk management appears to be an 
explicit identification of boundaries…making the boundaries visible may also increase 
system effectiveness in that operation close to known boundaries may be safer than 
requiring excessive margins which are more likely to deteriorate in unpredictable ways 
under pressure. (p.192) 
 
Another method to accomplish a new approach to control of system performance is to make 
the organization and its workers aware of practical drift situations and understand that going 
beyond the boundaries may lead the organization into an unanticipated and unwanted failure.  
 
It can be argued that feedback between all levels is essential within any system in order to 
ensure that interaction amongst key stakeholders will lead to the realization of the overall 
safety control requirements of an organization.  Rasmussen (1997) discusses the abstraction 
hierarchy in which he shows the interaction conflicts between institutions and companies at 
various levels.  Rasmussen reveals that:  
 
.. for human behaviour, we need a representation at the higher level of functional 
abstraction than the level used for task analysis.  Such a representation involves 
identification of the boundary conditions of the work space and the gradients in terms 
of process criteria guiding the drift across this space….we need a framework for 
identification of the objectives, value structures, and subjective preferences governing 
the behaviour within the degrees of freedom faced by the individual decision maker 
and actor. (p.191) 
 
Rasmussen’s (1997) abstraction hierarchy is depicted in Figure 2 below.  It shows that many 
disciplines and levels are involved in a dynamic socio-technical system.  Simply relying on a 
top-down, command-and-control approach derived through regulatory reform or policy 
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setting is inadequate in such a system simply because of all of the levels involved.  For risk 
management to function properly, there must be vertical integration amongst the levels 
through adequate communication and documentation so as to ensure that the nature of the 
hazards are known and dealt with appropriately.   If management crafts policies and 
procedures and forces them on the workers, the actual work done will most likely not reflect 
these policies and procedures due to the locality principle.  Bergström (2012) defines the 
locality principle as the implication: “that all actions in a complex system are local…each 
actor in a complex system controls little, but influences everything” (p.15).   An organization 
requires feedback channels so that workers have an opportunity to provide feedback on 
decisions imposed by management.  Of course, feedback loops can be supplemented by 
monitoring processes.  Without communication throughout the hierarchy, it can be argued that 
practical drift may occur because processes are not known or communicated throughout the 
levels thereby creating unnecessary risks by deviating from known processes and procedures.    
 
 
 
Figure 2. The socio-technical system involved in risk management.  Rasmussen (1997, p. 185) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
Drifting Towards the Boundary of Unacceptable Performance 
 
Snook’s (2000) discussion of practical drift in his book Friendly Fire provides another 
theoretical anchor.  His explanation complements Rasmussen’s model of boundary of 
functional acceptable performance and will enhance the discussion of how organizations may 
drift outside the boundary undetected and for locally good reasons.  Both Rasmussen and 
Snook agree that the system deviates because of pressures.  Usually workers and/or their 
organizations try to optimize getting the work completed while being influenced at various 
levels by local constraints.   Snook describes this process by indicating that: “Over time, 
practical drift gradually transforms the system into a more stable state of affairs, where strong 
local task-orientations overtake overly burdensome global rules” (p200).  In essence, Snook 
has operationalized Rasmussen’s theory.   
 
Dekker, Hollnagel, Woods and Cook (2008) indicate that: 
Perrow (1984) promoted the idea of system accidents. Rather than being the result of a 
few or a number of component failures, accidents involve the unanticipated interaction 
of a multitude of events in a complex system – events and interactions whose 
combinatorial explosion can quickly outwit people’s best efforts at predicting and 
mitigating disaster (p. 26). 
 
Snook (2000) developed a dynamic theory built upon Perrow’s  (1999) Interaction/Coupling 
theory.  Snook’s theory of “practical drift” captures “both contextual and temporal aspects” 
(p.186); the important contribution is the addition of organizational change over time.  The 
theory of practical drift “captures three dimensions: situational coupling, logics of action, and 
time” (p.186).  Situational coupling can be loose or tight, and the coupling refers to the level 
of interdependency between sub units.  Logics of action can be defined as the work 
environment in which individual behavior is shaped by objectives and constraints.  The third 
dimension, time, represents the cycle the organization follows during its lifecycle and how the 
interaction and mechanisms associated with situational coupling and logic of action drive 
operational performance.  Time is also very important when dealing with operational drift.  
As organizations evolve from a paper concept into operational reality, many of the design 
features envisioned by the original planners require adaptation when faced with operational 
realities for a myriad of reasons.   
 
 
 
15 
Dekker (2011) defines a concept of drifting into failure as: “a gradual, incremental decline 
into disaster driven by environmental pressure, unruly technology and social processes that 
normalize growing risk” (p. xii).  He indicates that no organization is exempt from drifting 
into failure.  
The main concern is that local procedures used in the field are fundamentally different than 
were envisioned when designing the work to be done.   It is important to note that not 
following procedures will not always lead to trouble.  Dekker (2005) indicates that: 
“Maintaining safety outcomes may be preceded by as many procedural deviations as 
accidents are” (p.133). Deviations may be necessary to complete a project under restricted 
conditions.  Perhaps the procedures did not account for the local environment and may need 
to be modified so as to keep the organization within the acceptable safety boundaries.  
Hollnagel (2009) indicates that: “Performance variability may introduce a drift in the 
situation, but it is normally a drift to success, a gradual learning by people and social 
structures of how to handle the uncertainty, rather than a drift to failure” (p.94).  
Notwithstanding, communication and knowledge of deviations must be shared throughout the 
hierarchy in order for the organization to either adapt to the situation, or define new levels of 
risk by either not accepting the deviations or mitigating the risk associated and learning to 
adapt. 
 
Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000) discuss ‘organizational accidents’ that “stem from an incubation 
of latent errors and events which are at odds with the culturally taken for granted, 
accompanied by a collective failure of organizational intelligence” (p15).  This argument is 
seen to have similarities to Snook’s contextual and temporal aspects of drift.  Snook (2000) 
discusses practical drift as the “slow uncoupling of local practice from written procedure” 
(p.225); the incubation period forms part of the temporal aspects of drift.  The incubation 
period of each deviation may eventually lead to failure when the system becomes tightly 
coupled.  Starbuck and Milliken (1988) discuss how fine-tuning reveals that “past successes 
and acclimatization alter decision-makers’ beliefs about probabilities” (p319).  This concept is 
prevalent in the belief of being able to practically drift away from established norms and 
procedures, each time doing so successfully, will not lead to catastrophic failures. 
 
Hollnagel (2009) discusses Efficiency and Thoroughness Trade-Off  (ETTO) in which he 
states: 
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…in their daily activities, at work or at leisure, people routinely make a choice 
between being effective and being thorough, since it rarely is possible to be both at the 
same time.  If demands for productivity or performance are high, thoroughness is 
reduced until the productivity goals are met.  If demands for safety are high, efficiency 
is reduced until the safety goals are met. (p.15)  
 
ETTO can place employees in a double bind situation.  Workers may deviate from prescribed 
work practices because they believe that there is a need to become more efficient, specifically 
if they are not trained to cope with the realities of operating near the boundaries.  It is 
necessary to make the boundaries explicit and known and provide opportunities to develop 
skills at boundaries; thereby allowing for the correct mix of efficiency and thoroughness. 
 
Saurin and Carim (2011) quote Hollnagel indicating that resilience engineering “stresses 
understanding how success is achieved, how people and organizations learn and adapt, and 
thus create safety in an environment with hazards, tradeoffs, and multiple goals.” (p.355) 
 
Xiao, Sanderson, Clayton and Venkatesh (2010) reveal that “Hollnagel advocates a positive 
view of performance variability as a normal and necessary part of effective work practice” 
(p.144).  Performance variability is defined as “largely a collection of well-learned and well-
accepted strategies that people use proactively to maintain balance between efficiency and 
thoroughness demands” (p.144). 
 
There are numerous tradeoffs of efficiency and thoroughness occurring daily within air 
operations; however, in order to maintain safety, there is a need to monitor these tradeoffs so 
that an organization can mitigate the associated risks, learn and adapt. 
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Monitoring the Dynamics of the Production Point at the Boundaries 
 
Woods (2006) indicates that resilience is concerned with “monitoring the boundary conditions 
of the current model for competence (how strategies are matched with demand) and adjusting 
or expanding that model to better accommodate changing demands” (p.22).    Both Woods 
and Rasmussen agree that monitoring operational decisions made within an organization is 
needed to assess the risk of how the system adapts to operating near the safety boundary.   
 
Reiman and Oedewald (2007) indicate that there is a practical need to monitor an organization 
so as to establish a proactive and predictive accurate view of the organization and the 
demands of the work in question.  They argue that safety in industrial organizations is based 
on static and rational model of an organization and are non-contextual, thus are reactive in 
nature and are disconnected from the actual work done in the organization (p.745-746).   Air 
operations are considered to be complex and dynamic sociotechnical systems that are tightly 
coupled and have complex technology (Perrow, 1999).   They are dynamic in nature and 
require the air operator’s personnel to constantly modify and adapt to their work environment.  
This is consistent with Rasmussen’s (1997) concept on controlling behavior by making the 
boundaries explicit and known and giving opportunities and the tools for workers to develop 
skills at the boundaries.   
 
A resilient system must be able to monitor the system and its own performance within the 
system (Dekker 2003, Dekker et al., 2008).  Dekker (2003) indicates that organizations need 
to: 
 
1 - Monitor the gap between procedure and practice and try to understand why it exists 
(and resist trying to close it by simply telling people to comply).  2- Help people to 
develop skills to judge when and how to adapt (and resist telling people only that they 
should follow procedures. (p.236) 
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Assessment of health and safety management systems 
 
Costella, Saurin and Macedo Guimaraes (2009) have introduced a method for assessing health 
and safety management systems (MAHS).  Much like Snook (2000), they are concerned with 
the ability to develop strategies to deal with system variations that cannot be totally foreseen 
at the design stage and learn to develop skills at the boundaries.  Costella et al., indicate that: 
 
Given that all control systems tend to deteriorate over time or become obsolete as a 
consequence of changes, continuous performance measurement is essential…Such 
measurements can occur at different levels, such as individual workstations, individual 
management processes or at the level of the HS management system as a whole. 
(p.1057) 
 
Although Costella et al., (2009) use the term audit, I find that it connotes somewhat of a 
narrow interpretation of being restricted to only looking for non-compliance with, and 
deviations from, regulations and operational standards.  In such, I will be using the term 
monitoring throughout my discussions as I believe this terminology encompasses looking at 
the socio-technical aspects of an organization for deviations, drift, ingenuity, adaptations, etc.  
 
Saurin and Carim (2011) discuss the health and safety management systems (HSMS) 
assessment and use their experience over the past two years of undertaking assessments based 
on methodology of Costella et al., (2009) to modify their approach.   As a result, they 
modified the process to include an analytical framework for assessing the sources of resilience 
or brittleness in HSMS as well as provided revised data collection tools so as to increase their 
ease of use and reduce subjectivity.  Their work enhances Rasmussen’s (1997) theory and 
lends itself for assessments using the principles of resilience engineering.   
 
Clancy, Leva, Hrymak, and Sherlock (2011) have developed a program to improve data 
monitoring of safety/hazard in an international energy company and have found that real-time 
review of current safety data provided through monitoring facilitate the identification of areas 
where modifications to working practices, equipment, training programs or standard operating 
procedures might be appropriate.  This proactive approach also had implications for day to 
day operations efficiency as well.  In essence, this shows how a good monitoring program can 
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allow companies to be able to work near the safety thresholds described by Rasmussen thus 
allowing companies to become safer, more efficient and competitive with other companies. 
 
Monitoring tools 
 
Leva, Kay, Cahill, Losa, Keating, Serradas, and McDonald (2010) developed a unique form 
that reports on flight crew auditing of everyday performance in an airline safety management 
system.  Leva et al. (2010), propose a new reporting concept that aims at enabling employees 
with the ability to audit the operations of the company so that: “existing threats are identified 
and corrective actions taken and potential threats are predicted and mitigated before they 
occur…by improved information sharing, performance management, operational risk 
management and process improvement” (p.164).   Of particular importance is the research on 
line operation safety audit (LOSA), threat and error management (TEM), crew resource 
management (CRM) and the intelligent flight plan.  Each of which, if properly used, arguably 
contribute to enhancing the safety of an organization (Leva et al., 2010, Helmreich, Klinect, 
and Whilhelm 1999). 
 
Threat and Error Management and CRM 
 
Helmreich et al., (1999) discuss threat and error management (TEM) and the use of crew 
resource management (CRM) to deal with threats encountered in flight operations so as to 
avoid errors or unacceptable situations.  The threats can be either from expected or 
unexpected sources.  Aviation is dynamic and complex in nature and routine flights can 
quickly become fraught with challenges and dangers that were not anticipated.   TEM is about 
how aircraft crews can recognize threats and are able to deal with them successfully.  The use 
of CRM, TEM briefings are all designed to help crews be cognizant of threats and either 
avoid error or deal with them, thereby recover to a safe flight situation (Helmreich et al. 
1999).    TEM in essence allows operations at the boundary, discussed by Rasmussen (1997), 
being able control of behavior of flight crews by making the boundaries explicit and known to 
them, and by giving them opportunities to develop skills at boundaries through TEM and 
CRM training. 
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Line Operation Safety Audits (LOSA) 
 
Helmreich et al., (1999) indicate that: “Line Operation Safety Audits are programs that use 
expert observers to collect data about crew behaviour and situational factors on normal 
flights” (p. 678).  The use of data collected by LOSA provides the air operator with “a picture 
of normal operations and allow estimation within organizations of the degree of risk 
associated with certain environments, fleets, or type of maneuvers” (p.680).  LOSA satisfies 
Rasmussen’s (1997) risk management requirements in that it allows the air operator to 
implement measures to manage risks in operational context, determine if risk mitigation 
measures are adequate and functioning properly and to adjust their risk profile if needed.  
 
Intelligent Flight Plan 
 
Intelligent flight plans allow flight crews the ability to determine if threats exist for their 
particular flight and also provide other flight crews with information of threats that may affect 
future flights.  It uses existing, real time, information and conveys this information to flight 
crews in the flight planning and dispatch process.   According to Leva et al., (2010): 
“personnel will obtain feedback about potential risks to be considered for: 1) route planning; 
2) aircraft pairing and rostering process; and, 3) the development of particular flight plan by 
Dispatch”  (p.178).   All this information will help shape TEM briefings.   In addition, 
following the flight, crews fill in voluntary reports describing near misses, TEM strategies 
used and recommendations for improvement.  This is essential in closing the loop by 
providing feedback about what is actually happening at the coal face and allow operators to 
see if work as prescribed is the same as work as performed (Dekker, 2003, 2005, Woods and 
Shattuck, 2000). 
 
Leva et al., (2010) reveal that: “Current performance management processes within airlines 
often neglected operational feedback” (p. 175).  It can be argued that feedback is essential 
within any system at all levels in order to ensure that interaction amongst key stakeholders 
will lead to the realization of the overall safety control requirements of an organization.  
Feedback is a tennent in Rasmussen’s (1997) abstraction hierarchy in order to control 
conflicts at various levels between institutions and companies.  I will examine whether 
monitoring of an air operator’s system will determine if the feedback loops are functioning as 
designed to prevent activities from being conceived in isolation. 
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I will use the standards and guidelines established in MAHS and modify them to take into 
account a control approach to safety management based on flight operation quality assurance 
and examine whether they are used by an air operator, and if so, what effect it has on the 
overall safety of the operations.  In addition I will examine whether the use of LOSA, TEM, 
and Intelligent Flight Plan enhances safety in air operations.  How this will be accomplished 
is discussed in the methodology section. 
  
 
 
22 
METHOD 
 
Research Design 
 
Much of my research involved qualitative methodology completed through interviews with 
operation personnel, company safety experts, as well as senior management and also involved 
documentation review to determine evidence sources.  The research was ultimately aimed at 
viewing an organization’s Safety Management System and examined if there evidence of 
resilience engineering concepts within flight operation’s monitoring systems and whether they 
help flight operations stay within safety boundaries and also improve safety. In particular, I 
examined if the organization uses RE concepts to enhance their ability to create work 
processes that are robust yet flexible enough to adapt to varying risk scenarios, and whether 
the organization is proactive in its approach when faced with disruptions and ongoing 
economic and production pressures.   
 
Qualitative research focuses on collecting and analyzing information in many forms, from 
small numbers of instances or examples, in order to achieve as much depth and detail as 
possible (Blaxter, Hughes, Tight, 2010).  Woods (1993) defines the challenge in studies of 
complex behavioural situations as: “how does one achieve valid, generalizable results when 
examining complex behavioural situations” (p.229).  He recommends a process-tracing 
approach in which the goal is to “externalize internal processes or produce external signs that 
support inferences about internal workings” (p.223).  Woods recommends the following 
approach for data gathering:   
 1. Define	  the	  psychological	  issue	  being	  studied;	  2. Connect	  the	  test	  situation	  to	  the	  natural	  context;	  3. Collect	  data	  	  
 
Costella, Saurin and Macedo Guimaraes (2009) introduced a method for assessing health and 
safety management systems (MAHS) through the use of three main auditing approaches: 
structural approach, operational approach, and performance approach.  Costella et al., (2009), 
indicate that the structural approach assesses the system prescribed; the operational approach 
assesses what is really happening in the operation at the coal face; and the performance 
approach, which assesses the results of performance indicators (p.1056).  In addition, the 
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methodology emphasizes the resilience engineering perspective on heath and safety (HS) 
management taking into account four major principles as follows: 
 1. Top	  management	  commitment:	  	  implies	  demonstrating	  devotion	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  the	  company’s	  other	  objectives;	  2. Flexibility:	  work	  system	  design	  must	  be	  flexible	  and	  support	  the	  ability	  to	  cope	  with	  hazards;	  3. Learning:	  involves	  understanding	  normal	  work	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  learn	  from	  incidents.	  	  Of	  important	  note	  is	  that	  learning	  must	  also	  take	  into	  account	  the	  way	  procedures	  are	  implemented.	  	  Monitoring	  the	  implementation	  of	  procedures	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  important	  as	  devising	  the	  procedures,	  since	  it	  may	  contribute	  to	  reducing	  the	  gap	  between	  work	  as	  prescribed	  and	  work	  as	  performed;	  and,	  4. Awareness:	  actors	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  their	  own	  current	  status	  and	  the	  status	  of	  the	  defences	  in	  the	  system.	  	  This	  concept	  is	  critical	  for	  the	  ability	  to	  anticipate.	  	  (p.	  1057-­‐1058)	  
 
Saurin and Carim (2011) modified the process by Costella et al., to include an analytical 
framework for assessing the sources of resilience or brittleness in HSMS as well as provided 
revised data collection tools so as to increase their ease of use and reduce subjectivity.    
 
I applied Wood’s process-tracing approach and also used an adaptation of the methodology 
used by Costella et al., (2009) and by Saurin and Carim (2011) so as to take a system’s 
approach.  For example, through either structural, operational, or performance sources of 
evidence, the modified process will view whether an organization has LOSA, CRM, FOQA, 
non-punitive reporting systems, TEM, senior management commitment, flight data analysis, 
data management, hazard identification systems, risk assessment/management processes, 
feedback loops, training programs, safety policies, safety promotion, flight operations 
monitoring system, etc.  I then determined if each can be linked to RE principles.  I also 
investigated whether flight operations quality assurance monitoring takes complexity and 
emerging properties of a system into account and whether it relates the socio-technical 
interactions of an organization with the use of resilience engineering principles. 
 
 
 
24 
Participants 
 
There were four Canadian airlines examined in my study.  Two of the airlines are the 
country’s largest scheduled airlines.  The other two airlines are the country’s largest non-
scheduled charter airlines.  Each airline uses similar and also different monitoring tools.  In 
each airline, I interviewed the Vice President of Operations, the Chief Pilot(s), and the Safety 
Manager.  The interviews consisted of eight semi-structured, open-ended questions that lead 
to a number of follow-up questions dependent on the answers to the primary questions.  Each 
interview lasted approximately 1.5 hours in duration.  
 
The Vice President of Operations (VPO) is the highest executive level in charge of all aspects 
of flight operations.  The VPO is responsible for establishing the policy, philosophy, 
standards and performance measures required for flight operations.  Most of the responses are 
expected to yield structural data. 
 
The Chief Pilot(s) (some organizations have a chief pilot for each aircraft type when they 
operate multiple types) is responsible for administering the policies, procedures and putting 
them into practice for the pilots, flight attendants and other flight operations personnel.  Most 
of the responses are expected to yield operational data. 
 
The Safety Manager is the primary point of contact for safety information and is usually 
tasked with examining trends in safety data.  Most of the responses are expected to yield 
performance data. 
 
Some of the airlines with which I conducted my research had additional executives directly 
related to safety.  In these cases, I also interview them. 
 
Data Collection  
 
Much of the data collected was done through interviews and documentation review.  The 
interview questions were designed to ask the informants about the flight operations 
monitoring system as well as how risk management and decision-making processes and 
practices may have changed as a result of data they have gleamed through various sources.   
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Interviews 
 
The interviews were conducted individually at the company’s main base.  Before 
commencing the interview, I obtained consent from the informants to participate in the study 
by having them complete a consent form.  I asked each informant if I can record the 
interview.  In addition, I supplemented the recordings by note-taking.   According to Blaxter, 
Hughes, Tight (2010): “Note-taking gives you an instant record of the key points of an 
interview” (p.196).  It has been my experience the informants may not want to be recorded or 
may feel anxious about being recorded.  Blaxter et al., (2010) reveal that: “Recording, may, 
however, make respondents anxious, and less likely to reveal confidential information” 
(p.196).  Should the informant not consent to the recording, note-taking was used to collect 
interview data.  Notes and summaries of recordings (versus a detailed transcript) was given to 
the individual informant so that they can validate the content and accuracy of the data.  Some 
of the questions (based on Dekker et al., 2007) used to assist in collecting the data can be 
found in Appendix A.   
 
Documentation Review 
 
In addition to the interviews, company documents were analyzed, in order to find support for 
the answers given by the informants.  According to Blaxter, Hughes, Tight (2010) it may 
complement the primary data collected, and may confirm, modify, or contradict what was 
indicated during the interviews.  Company documents were also analyzed to find evidence of 
resilience techniques as well as any changes to procedures that may have occurred as a result 
of monitoring of flight operations.  Documents such as the operations manuals, risk 
management processes, safety data, management review committee reports, as well as 
findings from LOSA and other safety processes were examined. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
The data was examined to determine if the information from interviews and document 
reviews provided the researcher with the ability to determine if resilience engineering 
principles were present in an organization’s flight operations and if flight operation’s 
monitoring enhances safety benefits by allowing the workers within the organization to 
remain within the safety boundaries described by Rasmussen (1997).   Woods (1993) outlines 
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the basic set of steps to be followed for data analysis using process-tracing methodology.  
They are as follows: 
 1. document	  and	  interpret	  raw	  data	  into	  a	  data	  format	  that	  can	  be	  analyzed;	  2. document	  and	  interpret	  refined	  data	  to	  construct	  a	  concept-­‐dependent	  description	  or	  explanation	  of	  each	  main	  theme	  or	  phenomenon;	  3. analyze	  these	  concept-­‐dependent	  analyses	  with	  respect	  to	  cognitive	  questions	  of	  interest.	  	  
 
Braun and Clarke (2006), as cited in Blaxter et al. (2010), discuss a method to interpret and 
define themes from raw data through thematic analysis.  They indicate the following steps 
(p.233): 
 1. Familiarize	  yourself	  with	  your	  data;	  2. Code	  interesting	  features	  of	  the	  data	  in	  a	  systematic	  way;	  3. Review	  themes;	  4. Define	  and	  name	  themes;	  5. Relate	  analysis	  to	  research	  question.	  	  
The steps discussed by Braun and Clarke (2006), as well as Creswell’s (2007) analysis 
strategies that discuss reducing data into themes, was used to complement Woods (1993) 
process-tracing methodology. 
 
Ethical Considerations and Confidentiality 
 
The research was done strictly for academic and safety purposes.  Ethical approval for my 
thesis was obtained from the Assistant Deputy Minister of Transport.  In addition, ethical 
approval was obtained from each airline that will take part in the research.  Appendix A is an 
e-mail that was sent to the Vice President of Operations of each airline.  The e-mail served to 
introduce myself and indicate that I have support from my organization to conduct the 
research.  The e-mail was used to brief the Chief Operating Officers and top executives of the 
airlines so as to ascertain if there were any objections or ethical concerns with my research.  
Agreement has been obtained from each airline to conduct the research with the assistance of 
key personnel.  The airlines have responded in a supportive manner and agreed to provide full 
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access to their personnel and relevant documents.  Other than the informant’s time, there is no 
cost or remuneration for this agreement. 
 
Appendix B is a participant’s package that was given to informants during my briefing prior 
to starting the interviews.   The package contained background and information about the 
research, how they can get information about the results of the study, who I am and what my 
role is, how data and secrecy will be managed, a statement that notes taken during the 
interview and synopsis of the recordings (if recording was agreed to) will be sent to them for 
confirmation before the data is used, that participation is voluntary, and that they may 
withdraw at anytime during the process.   Airline names will be kept confidential in order to 
protect the identity of the informants interviewed (i.e.: there is only one Vice President of 
Operations in an Airline).   
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RESULTS 
 
Over several months, I conducted interviews with operation personnel, company safety 
experts, as well as senior management in the flight operations departments of four Canadian 
Airlines.  Two of the airlines were the country’s largest scheduled airlines while the other two 
were the country’s largest non-scheduled charter airlines.  In addition to the interviews, I 
conducted documentation review of the company’s flight operations manuals, policies and 
procedures, as well as of the subject airline’s SMS manuals.   
The Context 
 
Whilst conducting my research, I was made privy to how airlines monitor flight operations 
and make use of the data they have collected.  During candidate interviews and company 
documentation review, it became evident that the methodology for monitoring and acquiring 
data was similar throughout all of the airlines involved in this study; nevertheless, there were 
some differences with what was done with the data once it was collected.  The similarities in 
methodology for monitoring and acquiring data that each company demonstrated were, inter 
alia, an established Safety Management System; risk management processes; safety reporting 
system(s); quality assurance audits; intelligent flight plans; and, various monitoring tools.   
 
The following will discuss the similarities and differences amongst the airlines involved in the 
study.  One of the differences that existed is in how the subject airlines dealt with the data 
gathered during their Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) initiatives. 
 
LOSA 
 
Three of the four subject airlines used LOSA as a monitoring tool.  The fourth company was 
about to embark on a LOSA initiative.  Interviews with senior management of the four 
companies revealed that they used (or will use) LOSA with the intent of identifying inherent 
risks or deviations from procedures that may affect their operations. 
 
The interviews revealed how the airlines handled their LOSA data.  The three companies that 
underwent a LOSA initiative did so using the LOSA Collaborative.  The LOSA Collaborative, 
led by James Klinect PhD, is a user-network of researchers, pilots, safety professionals, and 
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airline representatives collaborating to provide oversight and the implementation of LOSA as 
a safety tool. 
 
The Collaborative provided the airlines with two days of training in Threat and Error 
framework, which included, inter alia, how observers were to conduct inflight safety audits, 
how they gather data, how they code the data, and how to write the reports on the safety 
audits conducted.  The observers attended formal classroom lectures and underwent practice 
evaluations and observations conducted by the Collaborative instructor.  One of the 
instructor’s main goals was standardizing how the safety audits were conducted, the data 
coded, and the reports written; therefore, trying to control performance variability. 
 
The observers would then gather data through cockpit observations during actual line 
operations.  One of the issues with having an observer in the cockpit is that the observer is 
said to influence the performance and actions of those being observed.  Notwithstanding, 
evaluations and observations are a necessary part of a pilot’s professional career.  Pilots are 
constantly being observed, evaluated, and monitored through simulator checks, line 
indoctrination, line checks and other evaluation exercises in order to maintain their 
professional qualifications.  The observers being used in the LOSA exercise were trained to 
be as unobtrusive as possible.  Observation, nevertheless, does influence those being 
observed.  The extent to which pilots are influenced by observation as a group or as an 
individual during the LOSA exercise is not known and was not measured as part of this 
research.  I focused rather on the results of the LOSA exercise to determine what the subject 
airlines did with the resulting data.   
 
A review of Company C documentation revealed that once the data is sent to the 
Collaborative, analysts read the report narrative and check that every threat and error has been 
coded accurately.  Once the initial data check is complete, airline representatives, who are 
fleet experts, attend a data verification session with the Collaborative analysts so as to ensure 
data accuracy.  Once the LOSA exercise was completed, each airline received a final report 
from the LOSA Collaborative that examined the data gathered during the LOSA exercises.   
 
Company A implemented some changes as a result of the data contained in the report; 
however, proceeded to file the report for future reference before all the data could be 
reviewed.  Interviews with company executives indicated that they did not complete a 
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thorough review because of other priorities and that they were satisfied that the LOSA report 
confirmed what they already knew (company A, interviewee #2).  Company B, interviewee # 
3 indicated that their company became very busy with other initiatives and they did not have 
time to focus on doing further work with the LOSA report.  Regardless, Company B indicated 
that their LOSA revealed that before departure, pilots were constantly being interrupted by 
others (maintenance personnel, fueling personnel, flight attendants, gate agents, operational 
control, etc.) while performing cockpit related duties.  “The flight crews are most disturbed 
during pre-flight preparations in the cockpit.” (Company B, interviewee # 5).  These 
interruptions were a constant source of distraction to the pilots and sometimes occurred at 
critical moments during the preparation (i.e. loading the flight plan into the aircraft 
navigational computer, dealing with weight and balance issues, dealing with aircraft 
performance data), therefore increasing the risk that the pilots may commit errors.  The 
company undertook a sensitization campaign with airline personnel to minimize disruptions 
of flight crew during ground preparations (company B, interviewee # 3).   
 
Interviews with executives from company A revealed that they looked at the final LOSA 
report and saw a lot of symmetry between FDM material and the report.  The LOSA report 
was then filed without further action being taken by the company (Company A, interviewee 
#2).   
 
The third Airline (Company C) took the LOSA data and wanted to use it to develop training 
and implement changes as a result of the report.  They quickly realized that the data of the 
LOSA report was provided in a more general, non-specific context, and did not offer clear 
guidance on what needed to be done.  The following is taken from an interview revealing an 
example of what the airline did with the LOSA results: 
 
Our report with our data comes with some very broad strokes, very broad statements 
indicating the prevalent threats, most prevalent errors and your most prevalent 
undesirable aircraft states, and at first blush it looks like we can take this information 
and use it for training; however, as soon as you stop and look at it, you realize we do 
not know anything about what is behind the data.  It turned into a very pain staking 
process of first targeting which areas of this report we are interested in, determining 
what is behind these airline operational pressures, threats and why do we have so 
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many of those that resulted in additional errors and what are these errors?  What is this 
telling us?  
 
Just the numbers themselves are merely pointing us in a direction that we have to do 
some research.  It leads us back to the narrative and it is the context that gives us what 
we can take out of the report (Company C, Interviewee #1). 
 
The airline changed procedures and adapted training to reduce errors.  Company C 
(interviewee #1, #10) indicated that they made LOSA program content information available 
to crewmembers in classroom settings.  Some of the issues discussed in the classroom were 
the most prevalent errors being committed, cross verification issues, checklist and automation 
issues; each being discussed with examples of countermeasures that could be used to reduce 
errors.  In addition, ATC threats were discussed with examples of challenging ATC 
clearances that resulted in crew error.  Managing ATC threats (e.g. challenging clearances, 
restrictions and late runway changes) became a large focus of the company’s annual 
emergency procedures training program for pilots.  The company also embarked on 
collaboration initiatives with the ATC service provider so that ATC could help minimize the 
threats by understanding the challenges faced by a flight crew that results from a challenging 
clearance, or last minute runway change.       
 
Risk, Hazard Management, and Communication 
 
Another safety tool used by all of the companies is the Risk Management process.  Each 
subject airlines had mature Risk Management processes.   
 
Hazards exist in every aspect of an organization. They are detectable through the use of 
reporting systems, inspections and audits.  Hazards can also be identified or extracted from 
review of investigation reports and from analysis of safety data and FDA.  The ICAO Safety 
Management Manual DOC 9859, pg 37, defines the term Predictive as “Analyzing system 
processes and the environment to identify potential future hazards and initiating mitigating 
actions.”    
 
An example of Hazard Identification and the Risk Management process is in how Company B 
used the Risk Management processes before beginning operations at an airport that is situated 
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in a mountainous region.  Another example would be the introduction of a new aircraft type 
(Company A, B and D).  In each case, change management processes and risk assessments 
were used to determine what hazards existed and if the risk needed to be mitigated before 
beginning operations into the mountainous airport or introducing a new aircraft type to the 
airline.    
 
Once a risk is identified, either through a safety report, threat assessment, audit finding, 
occurrence, or through FDA, each airline assesses the risk and determines if it is acceptable, 
or needs to be mitigated.  Interviews with company officials revealed that all subject airlines 
would stop their activity if the risk is considered critical and would not resume operations 
until the risk was mitigated to an acceptable level (interviewee #1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12).   Some 
examples are as follows:  One of the airlines stopped operations into a foreign country 
because the security threats from an unstable government became too high (Company C, 
Interview #10).  The same airline also cancelled a lucrative cargo contract because the cargo 
company did not want to have their cargo subject to Explosive Detection Testing or X-Ray 
screening.  The airline believed that it was too much of a security threat not to screen the 
cargo and cancelled the contract (Company C, Interview #10).  Company B refused to fly into 
a Caribbean destination during nighttime because of the threat of Controlled Flight Into 
Terrain due to the mountainous terrain around the airport.  They restricted their operations to 
daytime only (Company B, Interview #3).  Company A’s marketing department wanted to 
operate into a mountainous airport with complex approach procedures; however, the flight 
operations department delayed the start of operations until they underwent a complete risk 
assessment process and undertook risk mitigation measures which included additional 
training, route checks and on-going monitoring of the flights operating into the airport to 
determine whether the measure in place were adequate or they needed to be modified, or if 
additional measures needed to be taken (Company A, interview #12).    
 
Typical of all airlines, the subject airlines have individual departments that make up their 
organization.  Examples of departments include, inter alia, flight operations, maintenance, 
operational control, cabin operations, flight safety, cargo, passenger, environment, marketing, 
finance, and human resources.  Each department has specific duties to fulfill, and performance 
goals to achieve.  Goals sometimes conflict between departments, and, without open 
communication, risks may not be discovered in time to counteract their perverse nature.   
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Company C, Interviewee #6 discusses:   
 
The real key is an open and honest communication line so that we are aware of what is 
going on in the first place.  Once we are aware of it then managing the risk is very 
doable.  It is the risk that you don’t know about that is the hard one.  By working 
together, we breakdown the barriers. 
 
All the subject airlines have daily meetings to discuss previous day events that occurred 
within their operations.  While these meetings discuss issues that have already occurred, and 
are therefore reactive in nature, they help establish lines of communications between 
operational branches.  Operational branches will also use the information gleamed from the 
daily meetings to brief their staff.  Interview #7, Company B, indicated that some of the items 
discussed at daily meetings are used in company awareness campaigns.   
 
Safety newsletters and company communications are used as a means of disseminating 
information to front line workers.  The aim is to make employees aware of what is 
happening around them and in other parts of the organization.   
 
One of the airlines provided examples of sharing experiences with other airlines at a 
manufacturer’s conference.  They discussed how pilots became distracted in the middle of 
programming and not re-starting the checklist from the beginning; thereby, increasing the 
threat of a checklist item being missed; how the aircraft rolled back at the gate because the 
pilots did not set the parking brakes or the wheel chocks were not put in by the ground crew; 
and, how smoke in the cockpit occurred after de-icing because the engine bleeds were not 
turned off during the procedure.  These examples were discussed openly at a manufacturer’s 
safety symposium so that everyone could learn from the events (Company B, interviewee # 
7). 
 
In addition to the daily meetings, SMS regulations require that the companies establish 
meetings between the Accountable Executive (AE) and senior staff to discuss operational 
safety issues.  An example of communication required by SMS was taken from the 
documentation of a subject airline and supported by interviews from company personnel 
(Company A, interviewee #2, and 12).   The following details their meetings:   
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a) There	  is	  an	  annual	  executive	  operation	  review	  in	  which	  the	  Accountable	  Executive	  reviews	  the	  Safety	  Management	  System	  to	  ensure	  its	  continuing	  stability,	  adequacy,	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness.	  	  This	  is	  accomplished	  by	  reviewing	  current	  safety	  performance	  and	  then	  seeking	  and	  implementing	  improvement	  opportunities.	  	  The	  agenda	  consists	  of	  review	  of	  the	  previous	  year’s	  objectives	  and	  goals,	  review	  of	  the	  safety	  risk	  profile,	  review	  of	  safety	  policy	  and	  safety	  reporting	  policy,	  and,	  setting	  objectives	  and	  goals	  for	  the	  incoming	  year.	  	  The	  meeting	  is	  attended	  by	  the	  Accountable	  Executive;	  chief	  commercial	  officer;	  chief	  financial	  officer;	  chief	  operating	  officer;	  senior	  vice	  president	  of	  operations;	  senior	  vice	  president	  customer	  service;	  senior	  director	  corporate	  safety;	  branch	  heads	  including	  flight	  operations;	  maintenance	  (person	  responsible	  for	  maintenance);	  flight	  dispatch;	  in-­‐flight;	  security;	  airports;	  cargo;	  and,	  any	  other	  invitees	  as	  per	  the	  AE	  request.	  	  	  b) There	  is	  a	  quarterly	  corporate	  safety	  board	  meeting	  which	  discusses	  the	  culmination	  of	  all	  relevant	  data	  from	  other	  management	  review	  meetings.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  corporate	  safety	  board	  is	  to	  review	  and	  approve	  company	  policies	  and	  standards	  related	  to	  the	  SMS,	  security,	  quality	  and	  occupational	  health	  &	  safety;	  to	  assess	  unresolved	  SMS,	  security,	  quality,	  occupational	  health	  &	  safety	  and	  environment	  issues,	  and	  determine	  accountability	  for	  actions;	  to	  review	  company	  SMS,	  security,	  quality,	  occupational	  health	  &	  safety	  performance	  based	  on	  established	  performance	  criteria/indices/targets,	  regulatory	  and	  company	  policies	  and	  standards;	  to	  review	  SMS,	  security,	  quality,	  occupational	  health	  &	  safety	  Objectives	  &	  Goals;	  to	  review	  and	  develop	  corporate	  positions	  on	  proposed	  changes	  to	  legislation	  and	  regulations	  that	  could	  affect	  the	  company’s	  ability	  to	  effectively	  manage	  its	  responsibilities	  and	  obligations	  related	  to	  safety;	  and,	  to	  review	  and	  approve	  scientific	  studies/evaluations/investigations	  of	  employee	  health,	  safety	  problems	  or	  issues,	  as	  required.	  	  	  The	  meeting	  is	  attended	  by	  the	  Accountable	  Executive;	  Chief	  Operations	  Officer;	  Senior	  Vice	  President	  Operations;	  Senior	  Vice	  President	  Customer	  Service;	  Senior	  Director,	  Corporate	  Safety	  Environment	  &	  Quality;	  Branch	  Heads	  including	  Flight	  Operations,	  Maintenance	  (PRM),	  Flight	  Dispatch,	  In-­‐Flight,	  Security,	  Airports,	  Cargo;	  and,	  any	  other	  invitees	  as	  per	  the	  AE	  request.	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  c) There	  is	  a	  quarterly	  Inter-­‐Branch	  Safety	  Review	  Board	  (IBSRB)	  which	  analyzes	  documented	  safety	  deficiencies	  that	  involve	  multiple	  Branches	  and/or	  those	  that	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  within	  a	  singular	  Branch.	  	  The	  IBSRB	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  create	  working	  groups	  that	  would	  be	  responsible	  to	  address	  specific	  topics	  and	  report	  back	  the	  IBSRB.	  The	  IBSRB	  then	  develops	  and	  reviews	  action	  plans	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  solutions	  and	  tracks	  those	  action	  plans	  to	  their	  timely	  completion.	  Updates	  and	  reports	  from	  various	  branches	  are	  discussed	  at	  the	  meeting.	  	  Attendees	  are	  Branch	  Department	  Heads	  of	  all	  branches	  including	  Flight	  Operations,	  Maintenance	  (PRM),	  Flight	  Dispatch,	  In-­‐Flight,	  Security,	  Airports,	  Cargo,	  and	  any	  other	  invitees	  as	  per	  the	  Chair	  which	  is	  the	  head	  of	  Corporate	  safety	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  AE.	  	  	  	  d) There	  is	  a	  quarterly	  Quality	  Manager’s	  Committee	  meeting	  to	  review	  Quality	  &	  Audit	  Issues	  and	  discuss	  Inter-­‐branch	  Quality	  Management	  Strategy	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  branches	  are	  conducting	  their	  Quality	  Management	  Systems	  in	  a	  consistent	  and	  effective	  way.	  	  They	  will	  review	  any	  significant	  branch	  quality	  and	  audit	  issues,	  discuss	  corporate	  quality	  issues	  and	  provide	  an	  update,	  give	  an	  update	  of	  the	  IBSRB	  meeting.	  	  Attendees	  are	  all	  branch	  quality	  managers.	  	  	  	  e) There	  is	  a	  quarterly	  branch	  safety	  board	  meeting	  which	  provides	  a	  structure	  and	  process	  to	  manage	  all	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  safety,	  quality	  and	  the	  environment	  including	  SMS	  objectives	  &	  goals,	  and	  KPIs;	  maintains	  a	  process	  to	  monitor	  compliance,	  performance,	  program	  development,	  audits,	  and	  corrective	  actions;	  and	  ensures	  effective	  communication	  channels	  are	  provided	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  organization	  with	  up	  to	  date	  information	  on	  safety	  problems/issues,	  performance	  and	  corrective	  actions/measures.	  	  Attendees	  are	  branch	  department	  heads	  and	  any	  invitees	  the	  chair	  (branch	  head)	  requires.	  	  	  	  f) Lastly,	  there	  are	  weekly	  safety	  event	  review	  (SER)	  meetings	  which	  are	  intended	  to	  monitor	  the	  corporation’s	  safety	  performance	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Safety	  Risk	  Profile	  by	  reviewing	  incident	  and	  accident	  reports	  &	  investigation	  on	  a	  weekly	  basis	  to	  ensure	  corrective	  measures	  are	  initiated	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  The	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corrective	  action(s)	  are	  reviewed	  at	  the	  SER	  meetings	  to	  identify	  general	  trends	  that	  require	  further	  management	  of	  the	  Safety	  Risk	  Profile.	  	  The	  meetings	  consist	  of	  reviewing	  any	  new	  incoming	  incidents,	  occurrences,	  and	  hazards	  as	  well	  as	  discuss	  and	  the	  mitigation	  and	  corrective	  actions.	  	  Attendees	  are	  the	  branch	  safety	  representatives	  and	  the	  meeting	  is	  chaired	  by	  the	  senior	  director	  of	  corporate	  safety.	  
 
While I used Company A as an example to demonstrate communications through SMS, each 
of the subject airlines has similar meetings and communication processes.  When discussing 
SMS meetings and the importance of communication, one of the airline’s executive indicated 
the following:   
 
It brings everybody to the table, so that is right from network planning, IT 
(Information Technology), all the operations group, so inflight, pilots, OCC 
(operational control center) and everybody is at the table working together and sharing 
their challenges and their opportunities. Before we did that, the silos were, I do not 
want to say prominent, but there were silos.  The natural thing in a silo is you say you 
are fine, but they are no good.  When you breakdown those silos and you see the 
functionality that they are trying to do and you humanize it, you break down all those 
barriers.  Not only do we share each other’s communication, we strategize how we can 
communicate together, inflight and flight ops or flight ops and airports, we basically 
put out the same communication, but might have a very slight different flavor to it.  
By being together, by working together, we break down the barriers by sharing our 
actual communications, so airport leadership and inflight leadership are all on the pilot 
distribution list for our memos and I am on theirs.  I see the communications that they 
put out and they see the communications I put out and we dovetail wherever possible. 
(Company C, Interviewee #6) 
 
In addition to internal company meetings, external meetings with suppliers, stakeholders, 
government agencies, and other essential parties relevant to the operations of an airline 
continuously take place.   
 
Another communication tool used by all of the airlines is through their flight plans and en 
route communication devices. Each of the subject airlines had intelligent flight plan 
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capabilities; each airline had the capabilities to brief flight crews on issues that were 
encountered by previous flights on the same routes or keep the crews informed of any new 
development that may affect the safety of flight (such as significant weather changes).  The 
use of ACARS, SATCOM, and other communication devices were used to keep flight crews 
informed of any development that could affect their flight while they were operating the 
aircraft.  Pilots could also relay information about their flight to the Operational Control 
center so that it could be shared with other flight crews.   
 
On Time Performance 
 
Each airline is measured by their on time performance (OTP) for departures and for arrivals.  
This industry-wide measurement is used to rate airline efficiency; giving praise to airlines that 
maintain an on-time schedule; thereby attracting passenger confidence and loyalty, and 
increasing an airline’s market share.  
 
Trade-offs between production and protection (safety) are difficult because they occur within 
a highly demanding context which encompass pilot fatigue; weather conditions; stress of 
keeping to the schedule and making connections for on-going passengers; additional costs of 
operations by supplying hotels, meals, compensation to stranded passengers; and, the 
operational pressure of completing the flight safely. 
 
Monitoring is a method for airline flight operations to keep informed of issues that result from 
maintaining OTP.  Each subject airline discussed OTP as a hazard and a pervasive safety 
issue within the industry.  During the interviews, each airline indicated that through safety 
monitoring they maintain an awareness of the pressures their pilots faced when confronted 
with OTP, giving specific examples.   
 
Interviewee #2, Company A, indicated the following:   
 
The maintenance guys wanted a new policy on damage found within 30 minutes of 
departure.  If you find something within 30 minutes of departure, don’t worry about it.  
We are saying NO!  If you find something that is wrong with that airplane you tell 
maintenance and they look at it before the airplane goes flying.  You cannot ignore it 
because it is getting close to departure time. There is a fundamental misunderstanding; 
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my concern is that I feel that at times there is a drift caused by OTP, operational 
concerns that allow safety to slide slightly to the left.  It is not there all the time but 
when it is there it is evident and is uncomfortable. 
 
Interviewee #5, Company B discussed OTP and went on to indicate that when he gives 
training or releases a new captain on the line, he tells them:  
 
On time performance is big in the industry, it can come back to bite you.  You can 
rush, but only rush to reach the aircraft, once you are there, there is not much that you 
can cut.  If you are going to leave late, too bad, you will leave late.  You did your job.  
Once you get to the aircraft, take your time.  If you cut steps, then you become 
culpable and get into a “no man’s land”.   
 
Company C’s flight operations had similar stories about OTP and indicted that they advocate 
to their pilots against being pressured to cut corners.   Company C tried to make a cultural 
difference with how their flight crew handled OTP.  The airline worked on modifying pilot 
behavior and organizational culture.  They believed that OTP implies the wrong priority and 
felt it put undue pressures on their flight operations personnel.  To try to modify 
organizational culture, they coined the term SPOT (Safely Perform On Time).  A company 
executive, interviewee #14, Company C indicated the following:   
 
We were trying to improve our On Time Performance and there was a lot of push back 
that it is going to be unsafe.  Instead of OTP, let’s make sure we have an “S” in front 
of OTP, which is safely perform on time.  This started a shift.  What we were seeing is 
that through some groups, that as soon as they got behind their OTP, their discipline 
went away.  You could see it with the data we had.  What SPOT gave them the licence 
to do two things: 1) safety comes first, OTP comes second. 2) the permission to take a 
“safety time out”.   We’re having a tough day and everything is running behind, you 
should back out of that pressure a lot, and be disciplined and say hey, things are 
moving too fast, you need to take a safety time out.   Safety time outs are rewarded at 
our airline; although, we still meet with them to understand why they took the safety 
time out, not for discipline, but a better understanding of what we can change and 
what they saw.  The final piece is that if you are disciplined in the work that you do 
and follow your procedures.    
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Interviewee # 10, Company C indicated that:  
 
It’s important how you communicate to crews, how you encourage the ability to take 
the safety time out, that is why we do not use OTP (on time performance) because it 
implies the wrong priority, we use SPOT, safely perform on time.  From an 
organizational perspective, as a crewmember, what is more important? Is it safety or 
getting out on time? 	  Documentation	  review	  from	  Company	  C	  discusses	  On	  Time	  Performance	  (OTP):	  	  
Safety and OTP complement each other; the same actions that keep us and our 
operation safe are generally the very same ones that help improve our OTP. For 
example, a clear sense of purpose, the proper tools to do our job, appropriate 
checklists, clear and well-communicated processes and procedures, solid training, 
proper preparation and planning, etc. all promote safety and OTP.  
 
The intent behind safely performing on time -spot- is to ensure that our procedures 
support the safe and consistent on time operation of our aircraft and - with the help of 
crew input - make changes to procedures where needed.  The use of checklists and 
SOPs are vital elements of spot.  The potential to rush when behind schedule can lead 
to omissions and seriously affect safety.  	  In	  addition	  the	  company’s	  documentation	  also	  indicated	  that:	  
Safely performing on time has a positive impact on passenger experience and cost efficiency 
because it:  a) provides	  passengers	  with	  the	  service	  they	  paid	  for	  and	  rightly	  expect	  from	  us;	  	  b) can	  result	  in	  even	  more	  loyal	  passengers;	  	  	  c) significantly	  lowers	  costs	  by	  reducing	  expenses	  such	  as	  passenger	  hotel	  and	  meal	  reimbursements,	  re-­‐accommodation	  charges	  paid	  to	  other	  airlines,	  etc.;	  and,	  	  d) allows	  our	  operational	  team	  members	  to	  go	  home	  or	  off	  duty	  when	  they	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expect	  to	  versus	  working	  extra	  hours	  to	  attend	  to	  late	  flights.	  	  The	  subject	  airlines	  are	  monitoring	  their	  OTP	  and	  are	  assessing	  if	  pressures	  caused	  by	  OTP	  are	  having	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  safety.	  	  Pilot	  reports,	  safety	  reports,	  cabin	  crew	  reports,	  maintenance	  reports	  are	  all	  examined	  to	  monitor	  if	  OTP	  is	  diminishing	  safety	  according	  to	  front	  line	  operational	  employees.	  
I currently work for a large international airline as the Head of Safety, Security, and 
Compliance, and, inter alia, oversee the operations of our Ground Service Provider (GSP).  If 
the GSP causes a delay from the departure time of more than 5 minutes, they are penalized 
by reducing 50% of the rate they receive for servicing the aircraft for the flight.  Operational 
pressures exist to fulfill the on time performance obligations because of financial penalties 
assigned for delays.   Nevertheless, the Ground Service provider turns around hundreds of 
flights per day on time.  In 2014 they did not have any ground damage events.  The GSP has 
systems, training, and procedures in place that complement safety and on time performance.    
 
Flight Data Analysis 
 
Another method used for monitoring by all of the subject airlines is the Flight Data Analysis 
(FDA) tool.  The ICAO Safety Management Manual DOC 9859, pg 37, defines the term 
Predictive as “Analyzing system processes and the environment to identify potential future 
hazards and initiating mitigating actions.”  Predictive risk analysis is also useful in well-
structured, tightly coupled systems protected by multiple, technical defenses (Rasmussen 
1997).   
 
Each airline determines the flight data parameters they wish to monitor and also set what 
limits will trigger an event in the data collected (an event will indicate when an acceptable 
state is exceeded).  The following is an example of an event type measured: Indicated 
Airspeed greater than approach speed +15 knots at a radar altitude between 800 feet and 50 
feet (IAS>Vapp+15kts (800ft>RALT>50ft)).  Several events can be associated to unveil an 
undesirable situation.  For example: path high during approach at 1,200 feet + path high 
during approach at 800 feet + path high during approach at 400 feet = continuously high path 
during final approach.  This could signify an unstable approach and would require further 
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review of the flight in question. Predictive risk analysis uses accumulated flight data and 
determine if any trends exist so as to be able to take action before an accident occurs. 
 
Company A’s program measures over 2,500 aircraft parameters.  These parameters allow the 
airline to monitor 180 event types.  According to the company, FDA examination of the flight 
operation is strictly controlled and the outputs of the program are used to improve processes, 
identify issues and operational efficiencies and enhance safety of their airline.   Their 
company manual indicated that:  
 
FDA is recognized throughout the aviation industry as a critical element of any 
advanced safety program. It provides in-depth insight into a company’s operation and 
allows them to focus on hazards and trends that can place their operation at risk. It also 
allows a company to track data over time in order to better understand trend 
information and use this not only to refine operational standards and procedures (and 
compliance to SOPs), but also to address aircraft maintenance issues and 
environmental factors (Company A).   
 
It is important to note that FDA is not mandated by regulations in Canada at the time of this 
research.  As such, Canada offers no formal definitions, policies, regulations or protections for 
FDA programs.  Notwithstanding, the airlines involved in this study all chose to implement a 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) system using FDA.  The interviews conducted 
and a review of company documentation supported the view that FDA programs are an 
integral part of being able to monitor what occurs in flight operations.    
 
All four airlines discussed unstabilized approaches as being a major threat to safety; each 
having specific examples of changing procedures as a result of what was discovered  
(Company A, Company B, Company C, Company D; interviewee # 1,3,4,7).    Ten percent of 
accidents between 2009 and 2013 cited an unstable approach as a factor (IATA Safety Report 
2013, pg. 76). 
 
The following is an example of how a company used FDA to modify their flight operations.  
Company C flew to a destination airport in a mountainous region.  The company had 
approximately 19% unstable approaches when landing at the airport.  It was discovered that in 
many cases the pilots had not stabilized their aircraft prior to landing (a stabilized approach is 
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one that the aircraft is on flight path, within threshold speeds for the approach and is properly 
configured for the landing). Last year the company introduced LOFT training sessions with a 
Radio Navigation Performance (RNP) approach into the mountainous region airport.  The 
unstable approaches were reduced to 6.5%.  Originally, there was no instrument guidance for 
the approach and the pilots had to visually fly the approach resulting in a high rate of unstable 
approaches (approximately 1 in 5 approaches).  In order to control performance variability, 
the company introduced a RNP instrument approach and trained their pilots to set up VOR 
bearings lines so that when you crossed them you could start turning to the final approach 
heading.  They trained their pilots in the simulator with modified procedures, and as a result, 
the rates of unstable approaches decreased.   
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ANALYSIS 
 
Data gathered during the field phase was analyzed in order to interpret if the subject airline’s 
flight operations monitoring affected the resilience of the operating system.  The data was also 
analyzed to interpret if the airline’s flight operations use monitoring activities to manage 
performance variability; and, if adaptive capacity is being displayed.   
 
The interviews conducted with company personnel and a review of company documentation 
demonstrated that the subject airlines have a vast array of tools to monitor their flight 
operations.  Airlines are using monitoring tools to determine safety risks and when required, 
mitigate them so as to maintain safe flight operations.    
 
The following analysis is framed within Rasmussen’s 1997 Risk Management Framework 
and will reveal how the airlines use their monitoring system to make pressures visible, 
monitor the boundary of acceptable behavior and push back away from it with a counter 
gradient. 
 
Monitoring the gradient towards increased efficiency and reduced workload 
 
Rasmussen 1997 model demonstrates that because of the dynamic environment and 
operational pressures airline flight operations are subjected to on a daily basis, there “will 
very likely be a systemic migration toward the boundary of functionally acceptable 
performance” (Rasmussen 1997, p.190).   Cook, Rasmussen (2005) indicate that:   
 
Because the environment is dynamic, the operating point moves continuously; stability 
occurs when the movements of the operating point are small and, over time, random.  
Changes in the gradients (for example, increased economic pressure) move the 
operating point.  The risk of an accident fall as distance from the unacceptable 
performance boundary increases.  (p.130) 	  Flight	  operations	  monitoring	  in	  the	  subject	  airlines	  is	  being	  used	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  performance	  can	  drift	  from	  the	  intended	  objective	  as	  a	  result	  of	  workload	  and	  how	  the	  airline	  can	  adapt.	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Three	  of	  the	  four	  air	  operators	  used	  LOSA	  as	  a	  monitoring	  tool.	  	  Each	  of	  the	  three	  airlines	  used	  the	  LOSA	  collaborative	  to	  administer	  their	  LOSA	  program.	  	  Once	  the	  results	  were	  collated	  and	  the	  reports	  returned	  to	  the	  airlines,	  there	  were	  differences	  in	  what	  the	  airlines	  did	  with	  the	  data.	  	  Company	  A	  and	  B	  executives	  decided	  what	  to	  do	  with	  the	  data	  they	  received	  following	  the	  LOSA	  initiative	  and	  did	  not	  examine	  the	  LOSA	  data	  to	  a	  greater	  depth	  either	  because	  of	  performance	  shaping	  forces	  of	  financial	  constraints,	  management	  pressures,	  competing	  workloads,	  production	  and	  performance	  targets,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  these.	  	  Real	  operational	  pressures	  caused	  these	  two	  companies	  to	  set	  aside	  the	  opportunity	  to	  further	  examine	  rich	  data	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  enhance	  the	  safety	  of	  their	  operation.	  	  	  Hollnagel’s	  (2009)	  Efficiency	  and	  Thoroughness	  Trade-­‐Off,	  is	  seen	  at	  the	  corporate	  level	  in	  the	  decision	  made	  by	  the	  executives	  of	  Company	  A	  and	  B.	  	  
 The	  two	  airlines	  in	  question	  had	  mature	  operational	  monitoring	  tools	  that	  were	  used	  to	  determine	  if	  a	  safety	  issue	  existed.	  	  It	  is	  doubtful	  that	  setting	  aside	  the	  results	  of	  the	  LOSA	  alone	  would	  be	  enough	  to	  cause	  an	  accident	  to	  occur,	  as	  many	  flight	  operations	  do	  not	  yet	  have	  a	  LOSA	  program;	  however,	  rich	  data	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  examine	  deviations	  from	  existing	  standards	  and	  determine	  if	  pervasive	  safety	  threats	  exist	  were	  disregarded.	  	  Nevertheless,	  gradient	  pressures	  were	  present	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  Company	  A	  and	  B	  chose	  an	  efficiency	  trade-­‐off.	  	  	  They	  chose	  to	  expend	  resources	  on	  operational	  pressures	  rather	  than	  dedicating	  them	  towards	  further	  analyzing	  LOSA.	  	  The	  gradient	  pressures	  that	  Rasmussen	  (1997)	  describes	  in	  his	  model	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  exist	  in	  this	  case.	  	  	  	  Company	  C	  discovered	  that	  the	  aggregate	  totals	  provided	  in	  the	  report	  from	  the	  LOSA	  collective	  were	  meaningless	  without	  the	  context	  or	  the	  story	  behind	  them.	  	  The	  airline	  undertook	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  areas	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  LOSA	  report	  and	  was	  able	  to	  get	  context,	  discover	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  flight	  crews,	  and	  how	  they	  were	  managed.	  	  Armed	  with	  this	  information,	  they	  changed	  procedures	  and	  adapted	  training	  to	  reduce	  errors.	  	  Company	  C	  used	  LOSA	  to	  define	  the	  marginal	  boundary	  and	  through	  analysis	  established	  measures	  to	  strengthen	  the	  gradient	  to	  push	  back	  from	  the	  safety	  margin.	  
 The	  use	  of	  LOSA	  as	  a	  monitoring	  tool	  can	  give	  a	  company	  data	  that	  may	  be	  used	  to	  enhance	  safety.	  	  Company	  A	  and	  Company	  B	  chose	  to	  set	  aside	  the	  opportunity	  to	  expand	  on	  the	  LOSA	  data	  because	  of	  operational	  pressures;	  however,	  company	  C	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conducted	  an	  in-­‐depth	  investigation	  of	  the	  data	  and	  related	  it	  back	  to	  the	  flights	  in	  question	  so	  as	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  the	  LOSA	  report	  was	  describing.	  	  The	  airline	  discovered	  that	  the	  aggregate	  totals	  provided	  in	  the	  report	  were	  meaningless	  without	  the	  context	  or	  the	  story	  behind	  them.	  	  The	  airline	  undertook	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  areas	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  LOSA	  report	  and	  was	  able	  to	  get	  context,	  discover	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  flight	  crews,	  and	  how	  they	  were	  managed.	  	  Armed	  with	  this	  information,	  they	  changed	  procedures	  and	  adapted	  training	  to	  reduce	  errors;	  thereby	  using	  LOSA	  to	  define	  the	  marginal	  boundary	  and	  through	  analysis	  established	  measures	  to	  strengthen	  the	  gradient	  to	  push	  back	  from	  the	  safety	  margin.	  	  It	  is	  only	  with	  this	  extra	  effort,	  additional	  research,	  looking	  for	  the	  “why”	  something	  occurred,	  that	  LOSA	  data	  is	  truly	  useful.	  	  Doing	  less	  will	  get	  you	  a	  report	  that	  only	  gives	  you	  high-­‐level	  generic	  information.	  	  Company	  C	  demonstrated	  its	  pursuit	  of	  understanding	  data	  and	  taking	  appropriate	  actions	  as	  a	  result.	  	  They	  learned	  from	  the	  exercise	  and	  used	  the	  data	  to	  modify	  procedures	  even	  though	  they	  faced	  similar	  resource	  constraints	  and	  operational	  pressures	  as	  the	  other	  two	  airlines.	  	  Monitoring	  and	  learning	  are	  two	  cornerstones	  of	  resilience.	  
 
FDA is being used as a tool in which trends are identified, giving the ability to research why 
they occur.  ICAO uses the term “predictive” when describing the ability to collate data and 
determine whether trends that could affect flight safety are happening. Woods, Cook (2001) 
indicated that “high-reliability organizations create safety by anticipating and planning for the 
unexpected events and future surprises” (p. 93). The terms anticipation and foresight are 
somewhat interchangeable. The issue is whether you can base future patterns based on 
analysis of past data.  FDA analysis falls under the predictive tools that airline flight 
operations use to identify trends, giving the ability to research why they occur.  It allows the 
airline to determine if flight operations are going outside of the performance and safety 
boundaries set by the airlines; to determine if there are patterns of exceedances that occur, 
thereby enabling the airline to see if deviations are occurring.   
 
Rasmussen (1997) indicated that it was important to make the organization and its workers 
aware of practical drift situations and understand that going beyond the boundaries may lead 
to an unacceptable occurrence.  Documentation and interviews confirmed that flight 
operations used FDA information to show a series of unstable approaches at an airport in a 
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mountainous region.  This data was then be corroborated through interviews with flight crew 
and through safety reports that were submitted.  Risk was then determined through a risk 
analysis process and emergent properties were examined.  The risks were found to be too high 
without mitigation.  The company modified their training program and SOPs in the hope of 
lowering unstable approaches; thereby controlling performance variability.    
 
Nevertheless, trying to extemporize the location of the boundary through the FDA process 
alone does not provide a complete picture.  Other factors must also be part of the solution.   
Factors such as the examination of safety reports will also reveal when flight crews skirt the 
boundaries of acceptable performance; a more in depth investigations into known deviations 
from Operating Procedures may also reveal important safety information. 
 
Leva et al. (2010), indicate that through monitoring: “existing threats are identified and 
corrective actions taken and potential threats are predicted and mitigated before they 
occur…by improved information sharing, performance management, operational risk 
management and process improvement” (p.164).   The data gathered during interviews and 
documentation review revealed that airlines flight operations have numerous threats and 
operate in a high-risk environment.  The use of monitoring tools such as LOSA and FDA 
combined with the ability to perform risk management help the airline’s flight operations 
remain within the boundary of functionally acceptable performance.  Monitoring through 
LOSA and FDA makes the pressures visible and allow the airline to monitor when flight 
operations are getting too close to the boundary of acceptable performance; thereby allowing 
mitigation strategies to push back away from it with counter gradients.  
 
Setting the marginal boundary 
 
Cook and Rasmussen (2005) describe the boundaries as “difficult to manage…because the 
environment is dynamic.” (p.130).  Airlines need to set their marginal boundary and then 
monitor and adjust it as they understand why it is crossed.  The use of Risk Management to 
determine if certain routes will be flown (i.e. flying into mountainous areas); or determining if 
the risk is too high to continue flying into a politically unstable country or over conflict zones; 
and, dealing the pressures of being on time are all good examples of an airline setting the 
marginal boundary.   
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A pervasive safety threat to airline flight operations, which is difficult to control, is the 
requirement to meet on time performance.  OTP can put flight crews in a double-bind 
situation.  OTP changes the operational dynamics of the system by making the system tightly 
coupled.  Workers may vary from established work procedures because they feel that they 
must make up the lost time.  The additional pressure OTP imposes on flight operations can 
cause employees to seek shortcuts to complete their work, thereby, creating gaps in 
operational procedures and increasing the likelihood of error.  It is incumbent on flight 
operations to minimize flight crew performance variability and ensure that the pressures are 
fully understood by the flight crew so that they may adapt their operations and fine tune how 
they successfully and safely carry out their flights.   
 
Rasmussen (1997) advocates that making the goal conflict obvious and showing where the 
boundaries are to the employees is imperative in increasing risk management.  During 
interviews and documentation review, it became evident that each airline discussed OTP with 
their pilots.  In two different studies, van der Lely (2009) and Parker (2010), indicated that 
flight crews have to deal with situations that are underspecified with operational procedures, 
they needed to extemporize, even invent procedures to accomplish multiple goals 
simultaneously, and to manage the negative side effects of procedures.  Airline flight 
operations work in a dynamic environment rich with hazards and emerging risks. 
 Although	  each	  of	  the	  subject	  airlines	  discussed	  the	  hazards	  and	  emerging	  risks	  of	  OTP	  with	  their	  operation	  personnel,	  Company	  C,	  in	  particular,	  attempted	  to	  instill	  a	  culture	  shift	  within	  their	  operational	  branches	  by	  making	  the	  goal	  conflict	  obvious.	  	  Morel,	  Amalberti,	  and	  Chauvin	  (2008)	  indicate	  that:	  “resilience	  is	  related	  to	  the	  capacity	  for	  recognizing	  the	  problem	  and	  making	  a	  safe	  decision	  in	  adverse	  conditions,	  possibly	  giving	  up	  the	  potential	  benefits”	  (p.	  2).	  	  Company	  C	  rebranded	  OTP	  to	  Safely	  Perform	  On	  Time	  (SPOT).	  	  Adopting	  a	  SPOT	  culture,	  the	  airline	  allowed	  their	  flight	  operations	  personnel	  to	  manage	  the	  side	  effects	  of	  the	  pressure.	  	  Company	  C	  chose	  to	  make	  marginal	  boundary	  more	  visible	  to	  their	  employees	  as	  they	  discovered	  that	  operational	  pressures	  placed	  on	  their	  flight	  crew	  to	  remain	  on	  time	  or	  to	  try	  to	  return	  to	  schedule	  times	  placed	  an	  inherent	  risk	  on	  the	  operations.	  	  SPOT	  allowed	  the	  flight	  crew	  to	  take	  a	  safety	  time	  out	  if	  they	  felt	  pressured	  or	  realized	  that	  their	  actions	  may	  cause	  unacceptable	  risks	  thus	  allowing	  the	  production	  point	  to	  migrate	  into	  an	  area	  of	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unacceptable	  performance.	  	  Company	  C	  mediated	  the	  pressures	  caused	  by	  OTP	  by	  allowing	  their	  flight	  crew	  to	  take	  a	  safety	  time	  out,	  and	  strengthen	  the	  gradient	  so	  as	  to	  remain	  within	  the	  boundary	  of	  acceptable	  performance.	  	  
Monitoring the gradients towards increased safety 
 
Proactive identification of hazards and mitigation of risks at all levels and across all levels in 
an organization (i.e. within and between layers of the abstraction hierarchy) enables airlines to 
monitor the gradient towards increased safety. Safety management activities including hazard 
identification, risk mitigation and timely operational communication are strategies that are 
contributing to an airline’s ability to increase safety.   
 
In order to examine possible risks to the organization before commencing a specific 
operation, the use of requisite imagination will allow risk managers the ability to step “outside 
of the box” when it comes to identifying possible hazards.  Risk managers can create realistic 
possible risk scenarios and provide risk mitigations before the actual operation begins.  
Westrum (2006) indicates that foresight may arise from “suspected trends and intelligent 
speculation” (p. 59).   Rasmussen (1997) indicates that an important aspect of safety is the 
ability to use risk analysis and that the use of risk management gives the operator more 
capacity to absorb surprise.   
 
SMS has mandated that the airlines have safety meetings involving the Accountable 
Executive.  The subject airlines all have documented meetings discussing safety issues and 
the resolution of these issues. Presentation of Key Performance Indicators and other safety 
initiatives are discussed in depth at these meetings.  The airlines have taken these meetings 
and have used them to keep the AE informed with what has been occurring in their 
organization. 
 
Communication is a necessary tool to understand and know what is happening in flight 
operations.  Rasmussen (1997) indicated that communication is an important requirement in 
the abstract hierarchy.   For risk management to function properly there must be vertical 
integration through adequate communication and documentation so as to ensure that the 
nature of the hazards are known and dealt with appropriately.   
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Sheps, Cardiff, and Robson (2013), discussed communication within a socio-technical system 
and indicated that: 
 
Resonance is the extent to which consideration was given to the notion that threats to 
safety or accidents can result from a resonance within and across levels of a complex 
socio-technical system, not just from the deficiencies at any one level alone and where 
vertical and horizontal integration is not limited simply to linear, upstream, 
downstream or side-stream control of information.  This is exemplified by how the 
lack (or poor communication) of information at various levels is understood and 
described; and, to what extent is there an understanding of the role of feedback loops 
(with both linear and non-linear pathways i.e. resonance) across levels of a complex 
socio-technical system that might cause the lack of vertical/horizontal integration or 
work processes.  (p.25) 
 
The time spent on integrated communications is vital for continued support and problem 
solving as risk changes within an organization. The use of SMS and risk management 
demonstrated that airline flight operations are involved in a dynamic socio-technical system 
because they rely on vertical integration amongst the various levels of the socio-technical 
network.  Through the use of meetings, safety reports, risk assessments, airline flight 
operations personnel can monitor their operations and take appropriate actions.  
Communications through daily meetings and formalized SMS meetings are also used within 
the air operations to discuss possible threats and the requirement for risk management.  
Communication was shown as a powerful tool to control resonance within airline flight 
operations.  Several examples of hazard identification combined with risk management 
processes were found in the airline’s flight operations.  The use of requisite imagination was 
also demonstrated when air operations had to use risk management techniques and imagine 
possible scenarios before starting an operation into mountainous areas or introducing new 
aircraft types to their fleet. 
 
Notwithstanding, even if Airline Flight Operations anticipate that a hazard might occur, you 
may not notice it until the threat becomes serious, and therefore difficult to manage.  In order 
to avoid such situations, you need to monitor whether or not the anticipated hazard is 
occurring in your flight operations.  
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High reliability or low reliability? 
 
Airline flight operations are considered as having relatively fixed marginal boundaries and 
deliberately restricted operating point dynamics.  Cook and Rasmussen (2005) reveal that 
commercial aviation are “capable of developing accurate, precise, and shared understanding 
of the current operating point location – factors that influence operating point movements and 
the distance between the point and margin” (p. 132).  
 
During the interviews and document research, it became evident that certain aspects of the 
airline’s flight operations are operating in a tight space whereas others are moving widely and 
rapidly in the operating envelope.   The use of standard operating procedures by flight crews 
is an example of when the airline flight operations have relatively fixed marginal boundaries 
and deliberately restricted operating point dynamics.  Nevertheless, there can never be 
operating procedures built for every aspect of flight operations.  Inherent threats, changing 
operating environments and the dynamics of aviation are all factors that can cause the 
operating point to move widely and rapidly in the operating envelope.   
 
Airline flight operations use monitoring as a tool to identify when the operating point moves 
too close to the boundary of functionally acceptable performance.  Airlines also use hazard 
analysis, FDA, Risk Assessments, LOSA, Communication techniques (which involves safety 
reporting) as predictive tools. 
 
Analysis of company personnel interviews and of company documentation revealed evidence 
that the air operators used predictive analysis methodology with their FDA.  Evidence was 
also found of changes to operational procedures as a result of FDA analysis.   An example is 
the changes to operational procedures to reduce unstabilized approaches undertaken by a 
subject airline. 
 
Airline operations also demonstrated the use of risk management to determine if mitigation 
measures needed to be implemented during their operations.   Operations into mountainous 
airport environments and procurement of new aircraft types are examples of predictive risk 
management.  Once operations into the mountainous terrain began, there was continuous 
monitoring to ensure the mitigation measures were sufficient and that new threats did not 
appear.  Each airline operations had a mature reporting culture as well as vertically integrated 
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communication procedures that provided communication feedback from the bottom-up, top-
down, and across silos. 
 
Enhancement of safety was demonstrated by Company C through an in-depth review of their 
LOSA report.  They discovered that the aggregate totals provided in the report were 
meaningless without the context or the story behind them.  The airline undertook an analysis 
of the areas of interest in the LOSA report and was able to get context, discover the 
challenges faced by flight crews, and how they were managed.  They then modified their 
training curriculum and operational procedures to mitigate the risks discovered through their 
analysis of the LOSA data.   
 Even	  though	  on	  time	  performance	  can	  be	  pervasive	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  of	  safety,	  Company	  C	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  safety	  and	  on	  time	  performance	  elements	  complement	  each	  other:	  good	  pre-­‐planning,	  forethought,	  clear	  procedures,	  good	  training	  and	  communication	  all	  lead	  to	  more	  safe	  practices	  and	  better	  on	  time	  performance.	  	  	  This	  concept	  was	  also	  demonstrated	  by	  flight	  crews	  taking	  a	  safety	  time	  out	  instead	  of	  continuing	  operations	  under	  pressures	  that	  could	  affect	  safety.	  
	  Monitoring	  is	  an	  important	  tool	  in	  the	  airline’s	  flight	  operations	  ability	  to	  enhance	  safety.	  	  Each	  of	  the	  subject	  airlines	  had	  a	  mature	  monitoring	  system.	  	  Notwithstanding,	  monitoring	  by	  itself	  does	  not	  make	  an	  airline	  safe.	  	  The	  data	  gathered	  through	  monitoring	  was	  used	  by	  the	  subject	  airlines	  to	  conduct	  risk	  assessment,	  change	  operational	  procedures,	  learn	  from	  others,	  anticipate	  the	  emergence	  of	  hazards	  into	  risks,	  communicate,	  and	  respond	  to	  ongoing	  events	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  	  	  	  Morel,	  Amalberti,	  and	  Chauvin	  (2008)	  indicate	  that:	  “the	  relationship	  between	  resilience	  and	  safety	  is	  much	  more	  complex	  than	  a	  simple,	  cumulative	  way	  of	  improving	  safety”	  (p.	  3).	  	  	  I	  found	  that	  the	  dynamics	  of	  airline	  flight	  operations	  and	  how	  monitoring	  is	  used	  to	  enhance	  safety	  form	  a	  model	  of	  system	  resilience	  in	  the	  face	  of	  various	  pressures	  and	  goal	  conflicts.	  	  	  	  Monitoring	  	  is	  just	  one	  part	  of	  resilience.	  	  	  What	  you	  do	  with	  the	  data	  you	  collect	  through	  monitoring	  is	  equally	  if	  not	  more	  important.	  	  Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  I	  gave	  various	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examples	  of	  how	  flight	  operations	  used	  the	  data	  gathered	  through	  monitoring	  and	  analyzed	  how	  it	  affects	  their	  operations.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  companies	  sometimes	  modified	  their	  operating	  procedures,	  changed	  their	  training,	  and	  opened	  lines	  of	  communications	  within	  their	  organizations.	  	  Other	  influences	  such	  as	  LOSA,	  FDA,	  Risk	  Management,	  Learning,	  Anticipation,	  Communication,	  Response,	  Reporting	  safety	  issues,	  Cultural	  shifts	  (OTP	  to	  SPOT)	  are	  also	  involved	  in	  improving	  safety	  by	  keeping	  the	  production	  point	  inside	  the	  boundary	  of	  functionally	  acceptable	  performance.	  	  	  Through	  Rasmussen’s	  theory,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  resilience	  is	  the	  system’s	  capacity	  of	  keeping	  things	  safe	  while	  counterbalancing	  economical	  and	  workload	  pressures.	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CONCLUSION 
	  The	  topic	  of	  monitoring	  flight	  operations	  was	  chosen	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  how	  airline	  flight	  operations	  are	  able	  to	  understand	  and	  mitigate	  the	  threats	  and	  inherent	  risks	  they	  face.	  	  The	  topic	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  aviation	  community	  because	  it	  has	  significance	  in	  improving	  safety	  by	  following	  adequate	  monitoring	  processes,	  thereby,	  provide	  the	  ability	  to	  identify	  and	  deal	  with	  inherent	  risks	  on	  a	  timely	  basis.	  	  	  Rasmussen’s	  1997	  model	  provides	  a	  framework	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  portrait	  how	  to	  maintain	  safe	  operations	  within	  a	  boundary	  of	  functionally	  acceptable	  performance.	  	  Notwithstanding,	  the	  framework	  is	  static	  in	  nature.	  	  The	  model	  does	  not	  show	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  operating	  point	  moves	  when	  a	  shock	  occurs,	  and	  how	  much	  pressure	  or	  combination	  of	  pressures	  will	  force	  the	  operations	  outside	  of	  the	  safe	  limits.	  	  The	  model	  also	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  to	  show	  workers	  where	  the	  boundaries	  exist.	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  found	  the	  concepts	  in	  Rasmussen’s	  model	  useful	  to	  apply	  to	  an	  operational	  environment.	  	  I	  can	  also	  see	  applications	  of	  the	  model	  for	  monitoring	  in	  the	  Medical	  field	  as	  well	  as	  for	  other	  transportation	  modes	  (shipping,	  rail).	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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
The interview questions and relevancy are as follows: 
 1. Tell	  me	  what	  is	  your	  primary	  method	  for	  monitoring	  flight	  operations	  activities	  in	  your	  organization	  and	  how	  do	  you	  apply	  it?	  	  Do	  you	  monitor	  on	  a	  frequency,	  or	  as	  things	  come	  up,	  in	  response	  to	  indications	  that	  something	  is	  not	  right?	  	  Relevancy	  of	  Question:	  	  The	  question	  is	  significant,	  as	  it	  will	  provide	  insight	  into	  what	  each	  candidate	  believes	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  method	  for	  monitoring	  flight	  operations.	  	  The	  response	  allows	  the	  researcher	  to	  understand	  how	  monitoring	  is	  applied	  in	  flight	  operations	  and	  seek	  benefits	  from	  the	  monitoring	  process.	  	  It	  will	  also	  allow	  the	  researcher	  to	  seek	  if	  there	  is	  company	  documentation	  that	  supports	  the	  response.	  	  	  	  2. What	  other	  methods	  for	  monitoring	  flight	  operations	  activities	  does	  your	  organization	  use?	  	  Relevancy	  of	  Question:	  Since	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  method	  to	  gather	  data,	  this	  question	  will	  allow	  the	  researcher	  to	  grasp	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  processes	  used	  in	  monitoring	  flight	  operations.	  It	  will	  also	  allow	  the	  researcher	  to	  seek	  if	  there	  is	  company	  documentation	  that	  supports	  the	  response.	  	  	  	  	  3. How	  do	  you	  identify	  risk	  in	  your	  organization	  and	  how	  does	  your	  organization	  cope	  with	  it?	  	  What	  processes	  do	  you	  have	  in	  place?	  
 
Relevancy of Question:  A main part of Rasmussen’s paper is associated with the risk 
assessment process.  This question will allow the researcher to determine how the 
organization views risk and how they cope with it. 
 4. What	  communication	  strategies,	  products,	  or	  processes	  do	  you	  use	  so	  as	  to	  have	  open	  communication	  lines	  between	  silos	  and	  levels?	  
 
Relevancy of Question: Another part of Rasmussen’s paper deals with the abstraction 
hierarchy where integration amongst and between the levels is accomplished through 
effective communication and documentation so as to ensure that the nature of the 
hazards are known and dealt with appropriately.  The response will allow the 
researcher the ability to view if the company has a system’s approach to 
communication and will allow testing of the decision feedback loop process. 
 5. For	  the	  Vice	  President	  Operations:	  -­‐	  How	  do	  you	  establish	  procedures,	  policies,	  and	  standards	  for	  your	  operation?	  	  For	  the	  Chief	  Pilot:-­‐	  How	  do	  you	  promulgate	  the	  procedures,	  policies,	  and	  standards	  and	  put	  them	  into	  practice?	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For	  the	  Safety	  Manager:	  -­‐	  How	  do	  you	  measure	  if	  a	  gap	  exists	  in	  the	  policies,	  procedures	  and	  standards	  as	  written	  and	  as	  performed	  by	  flight	  crew	  and	  what	  do	  you	  do	  when	  you	  find	  gaps?	  	  Relevancy	  of	  Questions:	  The	  response	  will	  give	  the	  researcher	  insight	  into	  how	  procedures,	  policies,	  and	  standards	  are	  developed	  and	  administered	  in	  the	  organization.	  	  It	  will	  allow	  the	  researcher	  the	  ability	  to	  view	  if	  there	  are	  gaps	  in	  how	  the	  procedures	  are	  used	  and	  if	  drift	  can	  exist.	  	  The	  question	  differs	  for	  each	  level	  since	  the	  formulation	  of	  policies,	  procedures	  and	  standards	  are	  done	  at	  the	  VPO	  level,	  the	  application	  is	  done	  at	  the	  Chief	  Pilot	  level,	  and	  the	  Manager	  of	  Safety	  can	  view	  if	  gaps	  exist	  through	  data	  collection.	  	  6. On	  a	  number	  of	  occasions,	  flight	  crews	  may	  deviate	  from	  prescribed	  procedures	  to	  gain	  operational	  efficiency.	  	  How	  are	  gaps	  between	  procedures	  and	  practice	  identified	  and	  how	  are	  they	  coped	  with	  by	  management?	  	  	  What	  coping	  strategies	  do	  flight	  crew	  use?	  	  	  Does	  your	  flight	  crew	  use	  CRM/TEM	  briefings	  during	  the	  flight	  planning	  and	  pre-­‐departure	  exercises?	  	  Relevancy	  of	  Question:	  The	  response	  to	  this	  question	  will	  allow	  the	  researcher	  to	  have	  insight	  into	  whether	  the	  company	  has	  the	  propensity	  to	  close	  gaps	  as	  they	  appear,	  or	  if	  they	  seek	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  gap	  exists	  before	  deciding	  on	  a	  strategy.	  	  Is	  the	  propensity	  to	  close	  gap	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  and	  not	  understand	  why	  they	  exist?	  	  	  It	  will	  also	  allow	  the	  researcher	  the	  ability	  to	  examine	  how	  practical	  drift	  is	  considered.	  
 7. How	  does	  the	  crew	  learn	  to	  adapt	  in	  pressure	  situations	  when	  they	  are	  dealing	  with	  issues	  that	  are	  not	  normally	  encountered?	  
 Relevancy	  of	  Question:	  	  This	  question	  will	  allow	  the	  researcher	  to	  be	  able	  to	  view	  if	  the	  organization	  has	  trained	  their	  flight	  crew	  to	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  develop	  skills	  at	  Rasmussen’s	  boundaries.	  	  It	  will	  also	  allow	  the	  researcher	  to	  see	  if	  the	  flight	  crew	  uses	  threat	  and	  error	  management,	  or	  intelligent	  flight	  plans.	  	  It	  will	  also	  demonstrate	  whether	  or	  not	  flight	  crews	  are	  open	  to	  generating	  and	  accepting	  fresh	  perspectives	  on	  a	  problem.	  
 8. How	  is	  the	  data	  gleamed	  from	  LOSA,	  FOQA,	  safety	  reports,	  and	  other	  flight	  operations	  monitoring	  processes	  analyzed?	  
 
Relevancy of Question:  This question is significant in that it will allow the researcher 
to determine if the data is used to enhance safety versus being stored for future 
reference or closing gaps by making people follow procedures that do not make sense.  
The researcher can also find sources of resilience engineering.  It will also allow the 
researcher to search company documentation for any modifications that were 
accomplished as a result of the data collected. 
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Appendix B:  E-mail sent to Vice President of Operations in each airline 
 
 
Dear XXXXX: 
 
I am undertaking research in order to complete a MSc in Human Factors and System 
Safety.  My thesis will focus on how an airline uses flight operations monitoring to enhance 
safety.  I would appreciate the opportunity to work with your airline to learn what type of 
monitoring system(s) you have and how the data gathered is utilized.  
 
I must declare that I am a senior executive with Transport Canada in the Safety and Security 
group.  My position within Transport Canada,  as the Director General of Aircraft Services 
Directorate, deals with the operational aspect of Transport Canada’s aircraft fleet in that I am 
responsible for the safety and oversight of the air operations and services to Transport 
Canada, Canadian Coast Guard, Department of National Defence (412 Squadron), 
Environment Canada, and Ottawa Police Services.  Although I do work for Transport Canada, 
the research I am doing is strictly for academic and safety purposes.  All work and 
recommendations will be shared with your airline for use as you see appropriate.  The 
information collected is not subject to Access to Information and will be de-
identified.  Ultimately, agreement must be given by the airline before I can include any of the 
information in my thesis.   
 
I would need to spend some time interviewing senior executives within your company such as 
yourself and your Safety Manager, as well as be able to view documentation to support how 
your flight operations monitoring is working.  I would plan to ask each candidate I interview 
approximately 10 open-ended questions about your flight operations monitoring system 
(questions will be sent before the interview).  An information consent document explaining 
the purpose and benefits of the research, that participation is strictly voluntary, and the 
confidentiality aspect, will be presented to each candidate before beginning any 
interview.  During the documentation review, I would need to be able to discuss various 
aspects of the documents with your flight safety professionals. 
 
I look forward to doing work with your organization and hopefully publish results that will 
benefit safety within the entire airline industry.  Should you have any questions or concerns, 
please feel free to contact me at the following: 
 
Office: XXX-XXX-XXXX 
Cell:  XXX-XXX-XXXX 
e-mail: xxxxxx.xxx 
Thank you for your support. 
Michel 
Michel Gaudreau 
Director General/Directeur général 
Aircraft Services/Services des aéronefs  
cc:  Gerard McDonald 
       Assistant Deputy Minister Safety and Security 
       Transport Canada 
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Appendix C:  Participant’s package 
 
The Participant package will consist of: a) an	  information	  letter	  that	  will	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  informants	  with	  the	  questions	  before	  meeting	  with	  them.	  	  The	  letter	  is	  aimed	  at	  introducing	  the	  researcher	  and	  also	  discusses	  the	  research	  topic.	  	  	  b) the	  informed	  consent	  form	  which	  discusses	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  research,	  what	  the	  informant	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  do	  in	  the	  research,	  risks	  and	  discomforts,	  benefits	  of	  the	  research,	  voluntary	  participation,	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  study,	  confidentiality,	  who	  to	  contact	  should	  they	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  the	  research,	  and	  their	  written	  consent	  to	  participate	  through	  a	  signature	  block.	  	  
 
a) Information	  Letter	  
 
Is there evidence of resilience engineering concepts within aircraft flight operation’s 
monitoring systems and do they help aircraft flight operations stay within safety 
boundaries and also improve safety? 
 
Dear XXXXXX, 
 
My name is Michel Gaudreau and I am working on a MSc in Human Factors and System 
Safety.  I aim to complete my thesis by January 2014.   
 
I am a senior executive with Transport Canada in the Safety and Security group and am an 
Airline Transport Pilot rated on a number of aircraft including the Airbus 320, 330, and 340.  
My position within Transport Canada, as the Director General of Aircraft Services 
Directorate, deals with the operational aspect of Transport Canada’s aircraft fleet in that I am 
responsible for the safety and oversight of the air operations and services to Transport 
Canada, Canadian Coast Guard, Department of National Defence (412 Squadron), 
Environment Canada, and Ottawa Police Services.  Although I do work for Transport Canada, 
the research I am doing is strictly for academic and safety purposes.  The information 
collected during this interview is not subject to Access to Information and will be de-
identified.  Ultimately, I must obtain your agreement before I can include any of the 
information in my thesis. 
 
With the support of Transport Canada and of my professors at Lund University, I have 
designed a qualitative research study aimed at viewing an organization’s flight operations 
monitoring system to see whether or not there is evidence of resilience engineering techniques 
that allows an organization to stay within safety boundaries and that also improves safety.  
Your input into this process is invaluable, as it will help me gather data that I can review and 
analyze.  
 
I look forward to meeting you soon. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Michel Gaudreau 
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b) Informed Consent Form 
 
Research Question  
 
Is there evidence of resilience engineering concepts within aircraft flight operation’s 
monitoring systems and do they help aircraft flight operations stay within safety 
boundaries and also improve safety?  
 
Researcher   
 
Michel Gaudreau, MSc Human Factors & System Safety (candidate), Lund University 
 
Sponsors 
   
Transport Canada and Lund University 
 
Supervisor 
 
Dr. Johan Bergström, Lund University, Sweden 
 
Assessor 
 
Dr. James Nyce, Lund University, Sweden 
 
Background and Purpose of the Research:   
 
Safety Management System (SMS) regulations require that airlines look proactively at their 
operations through a monitoring process with the aim to react, learn, and anticipate before 
safety issues give rise to the potential of creating an accident.  The purpose of this research 
project is aimed at viewing an organization’s flight operations monitoring system to see 
whether or not there is evidence of resilience engineering techniques that improves 
operational safety. 
 
The research is for safety and academic purposes and also forms part of the fulfillment of the 
requirements to complete a Masters of Sciences in Human Factors and System Safety with 
Lund University in Sweden. 
 
Who will be requested to participate in the study? 
 
Senior executives and safety professionals within four different airlines will be taking part in 
this study.  The goal is to interview the Vice President of Operations, Chief Pilot(s), and 
safety manager, as well as other senior executives within the airlines so as to achieve a sample 
size in the range of 14 to 16 (n=14 to 16) of individuals who deal with flight safety issues on a 
daily basis.  
 
What will be asked of you during the research:   
 
I am seeking your voluntary participation in an approximately 1.5 hour interview where I will 
ask for your insight concerning safety, monitoring processes, and risk management processes 
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in your organization.  The study will comprise of eight semi-structured interview questions 
that will be conducted face-to-face. I would ask your permission to record the interviews; 
however, if you are not comfortable with this, I will only take notes during the interview.   
 
Risks and Discomforts: 
 
Ethics approval has been given by Transport Canada and your airline.  I do not see any risks 
or discomforts from your participation in the research. 
 
Benefits of the Research and Benefits to You: 
 
There are a number of benefits of participating in this research project.  Individually, you will 
be able to gain insight into flight operations monitoring processes and its impact on safety.  
You will also be contributing to advancing aviation safety through your contribution, 
experience and knowledge of this important topic.   
 
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal from the Study: 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may chose to withdraw from 
participating at any time.  You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, 
if you so decide.  Your decision to not volunteer or to withdraw from the study will not 
influence the nature of the ongoing relationship you have with the researcher, his organization 
or supporters of the research either now, or in the future. 
 
Confidentiality: 
 
The information collected during this interview is not subject to government Access to 
Information laws.  Ultimately, I must obtain your agreement before I can include any of the 
information in my thesis.  The names and the specific content of the interviews will be 
confidential and only de-identified information will be used.  Your data will be safely stored 
in a locked facility and only the research staff will have access to the information.  
Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law. 
 
• The	  identities	  of	  participants	  will	  be	  protected	  by	  the	  assignment	  of	  a	  participant	  number	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  any	  information	  linking	  the	  informant’s	  name	  with	  the	  participant	  number	  will	  be	  done	  at	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  study.	  
• Notes	  of	  your	  interview	  and	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  recording	  (if	  taken)	  will	  be	  sent	  to	  you	  for	  verification	  and	  approval	  for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  study.	  
• Quotations	  will	  only	  be	  used	  with	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  would	  cite	  their	  participant	  number.	  	  
Who can I contact to obtain additional information about the study? 
 
If you have any questions or concerns and would like to discuss the study, please contact 
Michel Gaudreau at XXX-XXX-XXXX.  If you are interested in receiving a copy of the 
research findings, please include your e-mail address in the space provided at the end of the 
form.   
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Consent: 
 
Your signature below confirms that you have read the participant’s package in its entirety, and 
that you agree to voluntarily participate in this study. 
 Participant	  Signature:	  	  	  	  	  Participant	  name	  (please	  print):	  	  	  	  	  Place	  and	  Date:	  	  	  	  	  Permission	  to	  record	  interview:	  	  	  	  	  Participant	  e-­‐mail	  address	  should	  you	  wish	  to	  receive	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  final	  results:	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